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PRESERVING A POLITICAL BARGAIN:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NON-INTERVENTIONIST CHALLENGE TO
MONOPOLIZATION ENFORCEMENT
JONATHAN B. BAKER*

The antitrust laws prohibit both collusion among rivals and exclusion
of rivals, when such conduct harms competition. From an economic
point of view, the competitive danger from each is similar. A collusive

agreement among rivals involving price or output,' for example, harms
competition by reducing industry output and raising prices. Yet a dominant firm can reach the same end by restricting its rivals' access to key
inputs or the market, 2 thereby inducing or forcing its rivals to reduce

output and raise price.' Under such circumstances, the dominant firm
can achieve lower industry output and higher industry prices by reducing its own output. Anticompetitive exclusion4 can thus be understood as
creating an "involuntary" or coerced cartel.
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. The author .is
grateful to Stuart Benjamin, Jamie Boyle, Harry First, Andy Gavil, Al Klevorick, Christopher Leslie, Steve Salop, Jim Salzman, Mike Seidman, Phil Weiser, two anonymous referees, and participants in the law and economics seminars at Harvard and Stanford and the
faculty workshop at New York University for helpful discussions and comments. This article was written before the author joined the Federal Communications Commission, at
which he serves as Chief Economist, and does not purport to represent the views of that
agency or any of its Commissioners.
Collusive agreements could also involve other dimensions of competition, such as
quality of products or service, investment in future competition, or the development of
new and better products or cheaper methods of production.
2A dominant firm may exclude its rivals without necessarily forcing them to exit the
market; it may simply discourage or prevent its rivals from expanding.
3A group of firms collectively accounting for a dominant position and acting in concert can similarly exercise market power by excluding rivals.
4Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive
Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 135, 189-90 (2002). For an influential
survey of antitrust's prohibition against anticompetitive exclusion, highlighting how the
law implements these economic ideas, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YaL L.J. 209
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Notwithstanding the underlying economic similarity between collusion and exclusion,5 the antitrust norms against cartel behavior (collusion) are broadly accepted, 6 while the norms governing exclusion are
disputed. Most notably, the antitrust prohibition against monopoliza7
tion, Sherman Act Section 2, is contested terrain.
An unusual public dispute between the two U.S. federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, illustrates the lack of consensus
within the antitrust community over what counts as exclusionary conduct generally, and monopolization in particular. During 2006 and
2007, the FTC and the DOJ conducted joint hearings on how best to
enforce Section 2,8 but the two agencies could not agree on what they
had learned.9 A final report, published in September 2008, was issued
only by the DOJ.10 The FTC chose not to join, and a majority of its Commissioners termed the DOJ report "a blueprint for radically weakened
(1986). See also Susan A. Creighton, D. Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A. Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005).
5 Collusion and exclusion are also closely linked in a second way: a cartel may need to
employ an exclusionary strategy to prevent entry that would undermine its ability to exercise market power.
6 See generally William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST LJ. 377 (2003); Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger
Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (2002). The collusion norm has not always
been accepted in the United States. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933) (allowing a crisis cartel among distressed coal producers). Appalachian Coals was
effectively overruled in 1940. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940).
7 The monopolization offense prohibits a firm with monopoly power (usually measured as controlling at least two-thirds of the sales or production capacity in a market)
from obtaining or maintaining that power through improper exclusionary conduct, as
distinguished from "growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966). Sherman Act Section 2 was the primary antitrust statute employed by the government in attacking the Standard Oil and Microsoft monopolies. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001). The statute also bars attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize.
8 See generally U.S. Dep't of justice, Public Hearings on Single Firm Conduct and Antitrust Law, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/single-firm/sfchearing.htm. My
testimony is available at Federal Trade Comm'n and U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sherman Act
Section 2 Joint Hearing, Understanding Single-Firm Behavior, Section 2 Policy Issues
(May 1, 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/single-firm/docs/225232.
htm.
9See William E. Kovacic, Modern U.S. Competition Law and the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Comments on the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Proceedings Relating to Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmtkovacic.pdf.
10U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008) [hereinafter DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
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enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act."" Eight months later,
after a new administration had taken office, the Justice Department
withdrew the report 12 and declared its intention to reinvigorate Section
2 enforcement. 3 The passion in the debate is striking given that the
14
government rarely brings monopolization cases.
Controversy over the monopolization prohibition was also fostered by
the Justice Department's high-profile lawsuit involving Microsoft,
brought during the Clinton administration and settled in the first year
of the George W. Bush administration. 15 The merits of this case-and
what it proves about the role of Sherman Act Section 2-continue to be
debated by antitrust commentators. 16 The prohibition against monopolization is also at issue in an ongoing controversy over the antitrust treatment of bundled rebates or discounts by dominant firms. 7
In Part I, I discuss how during the first decade of the 21st century the
controversy over monopolization standards appeared in three arenas,
involving legal policy, economic policy, and politics. In each arena, the
dispute mainly arose as criticism of traditional approaches by advocates
of less intervention. I interpret the non-interventionist critique of monopolization standards through a political economy lens, as a potential
challenge to an informal political bargain reached during the 1940s by

1Statement of Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch on the Issuance of the
Section 2 Report by the Department ofJustice (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmt.pdf. The Commission had four members at the
time, and the fourth, Chairman William E. Kovacic, did not take sides. Kovacic, supra note
9.
12 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press.
releases/2009/245710.pdf.
13 Christine Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm.
14 Since 1977, the average has been less than one case per agency each year. See
Kovacic, Enforcement Norms, supra note 6, at 449 tbl. 4.
15 The government's complaint was filed on May 18, 1998, and the settlement was submitted as a proposed finaljudgment on Nov. 2, 2001. These and other government filings
are available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/msjindex.htm#settlement. For an overview, see generally A. Douglas Melamed & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, U.S. v. Microsoft: Lessons

Learned and Issues Raised 287-310, in ANTITRUST
Crane eds., 2007).
16Compare ANDREW I.
ANTITRUST

GAVIL

LAw: COMPETITION

& HARRY

STORIES

(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A.

FIRST, MIcROSOFr AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF

POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

(forthcoming

2010) (largely supportive of the case) with WILLIAM H.

PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE
MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007) (gener-

ally critical of the case); see generally Symposium: IdentifyingExclusionary Conduct UnderSection
2,73 A.NTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006).
17The dispute is described infra Part I.A.
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which competition was adopted as national economic policy in preference to regulation or laissez-faire. That bargain was reformed during the
1980s, through antitrust's Chicago School revolution, but not
overturned.
With a political bargain in mind, the past decade's controversies over
monopolization standards can be evaluated using insights from the economic literature on the stability of cartels. From this perspective, as I
discuss in Part II, the non-interventionist criticism is best viewed as a bid
for reform of the competition policy bargain, though it can also be interpreted as part of a broader attack on the post-New Deal regulatory
state. In Part III, I question whether the bid for reform of the monopolization rules will succeed.
I. NON-INTERVENTIONIST CRITIQUES OF
MONOPOLIZATION STANDARDS
Judge Learned Hand's influential 1945 opinion upholding a government monopolization case against Alcoa emphasized a fear of false
negatives-the possibility that antitrust law, by failing to identify violations, would produce a lethargic monopolist with little incentive to cut
costs or innovate.' Hand declined to interpret "exclusion" very narrowly
"as limited to maneuvers not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a
desire to prevent competition," because to do so "would permitjust such
consolidations as [the Sherman Act] was designed to prevent." 9 Consistent with this perspective, during the 1960s through the early 1980s, monopolization standards were placed under pressure primarily from
antitrust progressives. Most notably, advocates of no-fault de-monopolization during those years saw Sherman Act enforcement as inadequate
20
to address the problems created by dominant firms.
In contrast with Judge Hand's vision, Robert Bork, a leading Chicago
School commentator, expressed deep skepticism about exclusion as an
antitrust theory, particularly as applied to dominant firm conduct.2' Fol18United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945) (Alcoa). The
Alcoa decision revitalized government enforcement of Section 2. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETrrION POLICV 616 (2d ed. 2008).
19Id. at 431. The opinion also includes other language, often quoted, that can be interpreted as expressing concerns about the possibility of false positives. Id. at 430 ("The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he
wins.").
20 See generally William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and UncertainFuture of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1105 (1989).
21 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 346 (1978) ("[W]here an efficiency potentialappears in a case involving an individual refusal to deal, and there is no clear
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lowing Bork's lead, the primary criticism of monopolization standards
and enforcement during the first decade of the 21st century has come
from antitrust conservatives-those calling on courts and enforcers to
22
cut back.
These non-interventionist challenges can usefully be separated into
legal policy arguments, economic policy arguments, and political arguments. 23 Each has three salient features: it was seriously -offered, it has
met with opposition, and it has not (as yet) carried the day. In the
courts, two of these critiques have made major inroads, 24 but the third,
the political critique, has been soundly rejected.
A.

THE LEGAL POLICY CRITIQUE

25

The modern distinction between the legal standards governing predatory pricing and those governing (non-price) exclusionary conduct has
framed the recent legal policy critique of monopolization rules. In predatory pricing cases, the allegation is that a dominant firm has excluded a
rival (or rivals) by cutting prices, thereby leading competing firms to
back off from aggressive competition (as by raising prices) or exit the
market entirely. Competition is harmed if the dominant firm obtains
monopoly power, typically permitting it to raise prices above a competitive level, or maintains monopoly power, allowing it to preserve prices
above competitive levels when prices otherwise would have eroded. In
exclusionary conduct cases, by contrast, the dominant firm allegedly excludes rivals through other means, for example, by limiting or cutting
off altogether competitors' access to key inputs or to the market.

evidence that the purpose of the refusal was predatory, courts should generally find the
refusal lawful, both because of tie-breaker considerations and because predation by an
individual refusal to deal will be very uncommon") (emphases added); see also id. at 156
(firms "may conceivably" predate by imposing higher distribution costs on their rivals, but
this theory has both a limitation and a complication).
22 Perhaps in response to this criticism, contemporary "post-Chicago" antitrust commentary on exclusionary conduct takes a view located between Hand and Bork. E.g., Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 4, at 213-14.
23 These arenas are distinguished in part by where the challenge takes place. Economic
arguments are raised in the first instance in policy-oriented communities, legal arguments
are proffered primarily by legal commentators and before courts, and political arguments
are raised mainly in a broader public discussion.
24 Cf Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1967

to 2007, COMPETITION

POL'Y INT'L,

Autumn, 2007, at 3 (arguing that the Supreme Court

has been "methodically re-working antitrust doctrine" to align it with sound economic
analysis, generally through supermajority or unanimous decisions).
25 This section is in part the product of collaboration with the author's casebook co-

authors, as reflected in

GAVIL ET At.,

supra note 18, ch. 6.
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During antitrust's structural era, from the 1940s through the mid1970s,26 antitrust law treated both predatory pricing and exclusionary
conduct by dominant firms with comparable hostility. 27 Courts com-

monly accepted the idea that dominant firms used a range of weapons,
28
price cutting included, to drive out rivals.
Yet the possibility of predatory pricing was strongly questioned by
commentators. Many critics, particularly those associated with the Chi30
cago School,29 considered the strategy irrational for a dominant firm.
Price predation is only profitable, after all, if the predator can expect to
recoup the losses it incurs by cutting price by charging monopoly prices
once its rivals are driven out. The critics of predatory pricing enforcement argued that this strategy would be unlikely to profit the predator
because those higher prices are uncertain-rivals may not exit, and new
competition may arise even if they do-and because each dollar in later
monopoly profits is less valuable than a dollar in the initial loss. Moreover, the critics emphasized, enforcement against predatory pricing is
dangerous because it can chill legitimate, procompetitive price cutting.
Arguments like these persuaded courts to adopt two doctrinal rules
that throw up barriers to predatory pricing claims. The first presumes
26A brief description of three antitrust eras-classical, structural, and Chicago
School-is set forth in Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 60-75 (Roger van den Bergh, Roberto
Pardolesi & Antonio Cucinotta eds., 2002).
27 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (non-price
exclusionary conduct); Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (predatory
pricing).
28 The claim that Standard Oil had obtained market power through predatory pricing
had been generally accepted since at least the polemical writing of Ida Tarbell. IDA M.
TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904). Chicago School commentators questioned that theory, for example in John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958). Modern commentators tend to believe that Standard Oil achieved its monopoly power through non-price exclusionary conduct rather than through price predation. See, e.g., Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein,
Monopolization by "RaisingRivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case, 39 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1996).
2 The most strident critics of predatory pricing standards were associated with the Chicago School. See generallyJonathan B. Baker, PredatoryPricingAfter Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994). But the rules were also questioned by
commentators associated with the Harvard School. Phillip A. Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
PredatoryPricingand Related Practices Under Section 2 of the ShermanAct, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697
(1975).
30The claim that predatory pricing is irrational has been questioned in modern commentary, influenced by modern economic analyses demonstrating how recoupment could
in fact work. Baker, Predatory Pricing supra note 29; Patrick Bolton, Joseph Brodley &
Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. LJ. 2239
(2000); Aaron Edlin, PredatoryPricing,in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF AN_
TITRUST LAw (Einer Elhauge ed., forthcoming). The changing economic views of predatory pricing are surveyed in GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 675-80 (Sidebar 6-3).
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that a dominant firm's prices are not predatory if they are above some
measure of that firm's costs-usually average variable costA' The second
requires that a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing demonstrate that it
would be profitable for the dominant firm to engage in a strategy of
losing money initially; the plaintiff must do so by showing that the defendant would likely recoup those losses later." These doctrinal rules, in
combination with Supreme Court rhetoric questioning the rationality of
price predation as a business strategy, have made predatory pricing
cases extremely difficult for plaintiffs to win.33
By contrast, plaintiffs can more easily satisfy the rules applied to identify monopolization through non-price exclusionary conduct. Between
the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, when the Supreme Court was writing
4
strong pro-defendant predatory pricing decisions in MatsushitaM
and
35
Brooke Group, the Court supported the plaintiffs in two exclusionary
conduct cases, Aspen 6 and Kodak.3 7 More recently, two government victories in Sherman Act monopolization cases involving exclusionary con3
duct have been sustained on appeal. 1
Aspen and the D.C. Circuit's en banc decision in Microsoft3 9 together
establish a structured reasonableness analysis of dominant firm conduct.
Under this approach, a court first examines the conduct's anticompetitive effects (as to which plaintiff bears a burden of production), then
evaluates the monopolist's business justification (as to which defendant
bears a burden of production), and, in a final step, balances the two
(with the plaintiff bearing the ultimate burden of persuasion). 40 This
This standard was recommended in 1975 by Areeda and Turner, supra note 29, and
OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 274-81 (6th ed. 2007).
32 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Cargill Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
33 E.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant); but cf Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F. 3d
917 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment for defendant).
34 Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574.
35 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209.
36
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
37 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
3 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc); United
States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
39 Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34.
40 GAvIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 703. Cf A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive DealingArrangements and OtherExclusionary Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375,
381 (2006) (a balancing test gives firms insufficient guidance on how to comply with the
law without excessively forgoing aggressive competition). The balancing step is informed
by the choice of welfare standard (whether antitrust is understood as maximizing con31

was adopted by many courts. See generally ABA SECTION
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test is easier to satisfy than the predatory pricing test, most importantly
because it does not incorporate an initial safe harbor screen comparable
to the price-cost comparison used in predatory pricing cases.
The more demanding judicial approach toward predatory pricing was
seized on as a model by commentators who viewed the legal doctrine
governing exclusionary conduct by monopolists as making it too easy to
prove a violation. 41To raise the bar for plaintiffs, they proposed limiting
judicial scrutiny of dominant firm behavior to conduct that sacrificed
short-term profits; this approach would generalize the price-cost test to
apply to non-price exclusionary conduct. 42 Only if the dominant firm is
sacrificing short-term profits, the argument goes, can courts be confident that the conduct is the product of a potentially anticompetitive
exclusionary business strategy rather than procompetitive conduct. A variant of the profit-sacrifice proposal would limit the possibility of monopolization enforcement to exclusionary conduct that supposedly
makes "no economic sense" absent an anticompetitive effect on prices
43
or other dimensions of competition.

sumer welfare or aggregate welfare). Steven C. Salop, Exclusionay Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and Flawed Profit-SacrificeStandard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006). For a survey of
the welfare standard debate, see Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain,
73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 515-22 (2006).
41 Professor Elhauge describes Robert Bork, both as scholar and judge, as having done
the most to popularize a definition of "predatory" conduct that incorporates short-term
sacrifice. Einer Elhauge, DefiningBetter Monopolization Standards,56 STAN. L. Riw. 253, 269
(2003). Bork applied his definition to both price predation and non-price conduct, and
expressed skepticism about the plausibility of such strategies unless they involved misuse
of the courts or other agencies of government. BoRK, supra note 21, at 148-49. Some who
wish to raise the bar to proving monopolization through non-price conduct also favor
adopting a bright-line rule, such as the profit-sacrifice standard, on the ground that doing
so would encourage procompetitive business activities by limiting uncertainty as to what
conduct would be found unlawful. E.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under
the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Dea 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247,
1257 (2005).
42 See DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 10, at 39 (profit-sacrifice test draws on the
Supreme Court's predatory pricing jurisprudence). Ordover and Willig laid the foundation for the early 21st century legal controversy nearly three decades ago, when they proposed applying the profit-sacrifice test to analyze behavior in concentrated markets
protected by both entry barriers and reentry barriers, much as proof of monopoly power
is required before applying the price-cost test in predatory pricing analysis. Janusz A.
Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:Pricing and ProductInnovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981). Further analysis would presumably be required to determine
the competitive consequences of the conduct in the event the profit-sacrifice test was
satisfied, much as occurs in price predation cases through application of the recoupment
requirement. But if the initial screen is sufficiently stringent, the later analysis is less important for resolving cases.
43Melamed, supra note 40; Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under
Section 2: The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2006).
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These proposals for toughening the standard for evaluating exclusionary conduct by dominant firms by adding a screening step to the
analytical framework have been criticized as underinclusive, that is, as
leading to false negatives and underdeterrence. 44 The most important
objection to the profit-sacrifice and no economic sense tests is that anticompetitive exclusion could readily be inexpensive for the dominant
firm to undertake yet harmful to society.45 Such anticompetitive conduct
would be attractive to the dominant firm and difficult to rule out under
the profit-sacrifice or no economic sense tests. A related objection is that
these tests place the focus of the judicial inquiry on the dominant firm's
intent when it belongs on anticompetitive effect.
These criticisms of the profit-sacrifice and no economic sense tests
have reduced the interest in modifying standards for exclusionary conduct by dominant firms to parallel those governing predatory pricing.
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, advocates of tougher
standards for proving monopolization based on non-price conduct increasingly favored two alternative approaches. The first would limit the
definition of anticompetitive exclusionary conduct to actions that produce harms to competition disproportionate to the resulting benefitsa standard that would directly place a thumb on the scales in favor of
monopolist defendants. 46 The second approach would apply different
rules to different types of exclusionary conduct, allowing courts to impose an elevated standard for plaintiffs when defendant conduct is considered largely benign and the risk of chilling procompetitive conduct
the greatest, as with predatory pricing. 47 The Justice Department's recent Section 2 report, for example, called on courts to follow both of
these non-interventionist approaches, favoring the development of conduct-specific tests but preferring the disproportionate impact test when
48
conduct-specific tests are not applicable.
44 See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary DistributionStrategies by DominantFirms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (2004); Salop, supra note 40.
4 See generally Creighton et al., supra note 4.
46 See Gavil, supra note 44, at 61 (describing the test as "advocated" by the government
and "attributed" to Professor Herbert Hovenkamp) (citing 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT
651a, at 72 (2d ed. 2002)).
HOVENRAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
47 Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and the
Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (2006). This approach
can be justified on decision-theoretic grounds and, in consequence, is a means of raising
the bar of proving monopolization based on exclusionary conduct only if the terms of the
rule are specified against the background of greater concern with false positives than false
negatives.
48 DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 10. As an amicus, the DOJ had previously encouraged the Supreme Court to adopt the disproportionality test. Brief for the United
States & the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14,
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After this debate, it is unclear what standard the Supreme Court
would apply to evaluate the propriety of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. The structured reasonableness test described by the D.C. Circuit in its en banc decision in Microsoft, which recalls the analysis in
Aspen, 49 is an authoritative synthesis of Supreme Court precedent. But it
is hard to know whether the Court would continue to follow that precedent in a new decision, as the Court has recently questioned its jurisprudence in this area.50
The differing legal treatment of price predation and other exclusionary conduct by monopolists has also, and not surprisingly, generated a
prominent dispute over classification. 51 The controversy involves the legal rule that should govern bundled rebates provided to retailers by
dominant manufacturers. 52 The issue was framed by LePage's, an appellate decision in 2003 that sustained a district court's treble damage
53
award of nearly $70 million to an excluded rival of a dominant firm.
The dominant manufacturer argued that even if it were viewed as a monopolist in one of its product lines, its rebates could not be predatory
because they did not reduce the price of the monopolized good below
cost.54 The appellate court declined to judge the conduct using the
predatory pricing-like standard proposed by the dominant manufacturer. The court instead sustained the district court's verdict based on its
conclusion that the bundled rebates excluded a rival manufacturer, resulting in higher prices to buyers, with no procompetitive justification.
The decision in LePage's set off a legal controversy over monopolization standards because exclusion arising from bundled rebates or discounts resembles both price predation and exclusionary conduct. It
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No.
02-682) (sec. IlD), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2010OO/201048.htm.
49 The Microsoft decision relies on Aspen, but cites it only once. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
50 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 ("Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of Section 2
liability"); Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2008)
(Aspen suggests that a firm's unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability in "limited circumstances"). Appeals courts have followed Trinko and linkLine
in reading Aspen narrowly. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 316 (3d Cir.
2007); MetroNet Services Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1131-34 (9th Cir. 2004).
51 For a general discussion of problems of classification in antitrust jurisprudence, see
Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, CategoricalAnalysis in AntitrustJurisprudence,93
IowA L. REv. 1207 (2008).
52
Bundled rebates are based on aggregating the retailer's purchases of multiple goods
produced by the manufacturer.
53 LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
51 That is, the manufacturer claimed that the price of the monopolized product, one
product in the bundle, would not be below cost even if the entire rebate were attributed
to it.
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looks like price predation because the manufacturer cuts price for the
bundle, but it looks like exclusionary conduct (whether characterized as
foreclosure, raising rivals' costs, or tying) when the price cut is spread
over multiple products, the discount schedule varies with the amount
purchased, the dominant firm increases the unbundled price coincident
with offering the discount, or the discount is conditioned on- the
purchase of a bundle of products. Other courts have applied different
tests to evaluate bundled discounts than the test adopted in Le Page's,55
56
and the legal rules that apply to bundled discounts are not settled.
The classification dispute over bundled rebates provided to retailers
by dominant manufacturers involves more than a technical argument
about the economic effects of a particular practice. It is also, in part, a
proxy battle over the legal standard that should govern non-price exclusionary conduct by monopolists, fostered by non-interventionist skepticism about the value of antitrust enforcement against exclusionary
conduct by dominant firms more generally. That broad skepticism, in
turn, relies upon a number of economic policy arguments.

-5 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Antitrust
Modernization Commission also recommended a test for evaluating bundled rebates. AN-

TITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99

(2007) [hereinafter

AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommenda
tion/toc.htm. The Justice Department proposed yet another approach in the Section 2
report (DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 10, at 91-117), which the FTC majority criticized. Statement of Commissioners Harbour et al., supranote 11, at 7-8. For a description
and critical survey of the approaches adopted by the AMC and various courts, see Erik
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (2008). For an economic analysis of the
practice, see Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of
Bundled
Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 1132 (2008).
56
The treatment of refusals to deal is also hotiy debated, but that debate extends beyond monopolization to also include vertical agreements, vertical mergers, exclusionary
group boycotts, and tying and exclusive dealing under Clayton Act Section 3. In the monopolization context, the argument revolves around unilateral refusals to deal with competitors. The Justice Department's Section 2 report argued that unconditional and
unilateral refusals to deal with rivals should "not play a meaningful part in section 2 enforcement," DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 10, at 127, 129, as suggested by Trinko, 540
U.S. at 408 ("[e]nforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners,
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing-a role for which they
are ill-suited"). Professor Salop responded that setting terms of dealing requires nothing
more than determination of the monopolist's price and cost-a task that the Supreme
Court has encouraged courts to undertake when applying a price-cost screen in predatory
pricing cases. Steven C. Salop, Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically
Integrated Monopolist, infta this issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 709 (2010).
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THE ECONOMIC POLICY ARGUMENTS

The non-interventionist challenge to the rules governing monopolization through non-price exclusionary conduct is grounded in economics. 57 It is based on at least six economic policy arguments, some framed
decades ago by Chicago School scholars challenging various aspects of
structural era antitrust enforcement.58 Collectively, these economic arguments against monopolization enforcement contend that the cure is
worse than the disease.
(1) Markets are self-correcting.Monopolization is not a serious problem
because markets are generally self-correcting. That is, the exercise of
monopoly power will predictably erode over time through entry or
fringe expansion or, in high-tech markets, through leapfrog innovation.5 9 Hence false positives are more common and more costly than
false negatives.60
(2) Monopoly fosters economic growth. Monopoly is good, and monopolization enforcement counterproductive because the anticipated opportunity to charge a monopoly price induces the innovation and investment
that lead to economic growth. 61 Monopolization enforcement chills
procompetitive innovation and investment by current and would-be
dominant firms throughout the economy, even in industries not directly
involved in monopolization cases.
(3) There is only a "single monopoly profit. " A monopolist has already
obtained its monopoly profit, so cannot make matters worse through
conduct involving sellers of complementary products that is often
treated as suspect, e.g., by competing in related markets (sometimes

57Predatory pricing is also the subject of economic debate. For criticism of the leading
court precedents in this area as too non-interventionist, see the sources cited supra note
30.
5
8 On the transition from antitrust's structural era to its Chicago School era, see generally Baker, A Preface to Post-ChicagoAntitrust, supra note 26, at 63-67.
59
E.g., Fred S. McChesney, Talkin' 'Bout My Antitrust Generation:Competitionfor and in the
Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1412 (2003). On high-tech markets, see, for
example, Christopher Pleatsikas & David Teece, The Analysis of Market Definition and Market Power in the Context of Rapid Innovation, 19 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 665 (2001).

60 Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 15 (1984) ("[I]n many
cases the costs of monopoly wrongly permitted are small, while the costs of competition
wrongly condemned are large.").
6 E.g., David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly
Power and Its Implicationsfor the Objectives of Antitrust, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn
2008, at 203.
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termed "monopoly leveraging"), tying, vertically integrating upstream or
62
downstream, or selecting an exclusive distributor or exclusive supplier.
(4) Excluded fringe rivals may not matter competitively. The exclusion of
horizontal rivals to a dominant firm may not matter to market performance. Excluded fringe rivals are often small because they are inefficient,
63
high-cost producers.
(5) Courts cannot reliably identify monopolization, or effectively remedy or regulate it. Antitrust enforcement is not well-suited for improving market64
outcomes because of the limited institutional capability of courts.
Judges and juries cannot reliably identify harmful exclusionary conduct
by a monopolist because of the difficulty disentangling the benefits to
competition from the harms when the efficiencies arise in the same market where market power is alleged. 65 Nor can judges easily devise remedies for monopolization, even when a problem is uncovered,
particularly when slow-moving courts are asked to deal with fast-moving
high-tech markets.6 6 Not surprisingly, the history of monopolization enforcement is littered with misguided lawsuits and ineffective or counter67
productive remedial decrees.
(6) The prohibitionon monopolization is subject to misuse. Much monopolization litigation, government cases included, is instigated by unsuccessful and inefficient rivals. Those firms, having lost out in the
marketplace, seek to reverse that misfortune in the courts, either as
plaintiffs or as instigators of enforcement agency lawsuits, through
trumped up claims of exclusion.68 Even successful rivals may bring unwarranted exclusion claims, moreover, in order to discourage the dominant firm from engaging in hard competition.
62

E.g., BORK, supra note 21, at 372-75; Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 290-91 (1956); Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 925-27 (1979).
63 See, e.g., DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 10, at 100 n.100 (citing 3 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA

& HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw

749a, at 242,

749b1, at 249 (Supp.

2007) as making this argument).
64 See Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 15 ("the economic system corrects monopoly more
readily than it corrects judicial errors"); Thomas 0. Barnett, Section 2 Remedies: What to Do
After Catching the Tiger by the Tail, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 31 (2009).
6- See Frank H. Easterbrook, On IdentifyingExclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
972, 972 (1986) (-Competitive and exclusionary conduct [by a monopolist] look alike.");
BoRK, supra note 21, at 344.
66

See, e.g.,

WiLuAMJ. BAUMOL, ROBERT

E.

LrrN & CARLJ. SCHRAMM, GOOD CAPITALISM,

(2007).
Shoe Machinery
and IBM); Robert W. Crandall, The Failureof Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization Cases, 80 OR. L. REv. 109 (2001).
68 See Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 33-38.
BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 8-19
67 E.g., BORK, supra note 21, at 181-82 (discussing cases against United
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These arguments vary in their emphasis. The first four suggest that
monopolies are not very harmful (or are even, according to the second
argument, beneficial). The last two suggest that even if monopoly were
harmful, monopolization enforcement is unlikely to improve social
welfare.

69

These anti-enforcement arguments have received a serious reception.
Several courts have relied upon the "single monopoly profit" claim in
the context of analyzing vertical agreements, 70 and the Supreme Court,
in the 2004 Trinko monopolization decision, arguably offered three
others. 7 These arguments have also received a serious reception at the
2
Department of Justice.1

Yet they are controversial. Each has drawn a rebuttal in commentary,
and other courts ignore or reject them. 3 Six counter-arguments, set
forth below, respond to the six economic arguments for the non-interventionist position. Together the counter-arguments suggest that monopolies are harmful and that monopolization enforcement is likely to
benefit society.

69 These arguments differ in one respect from those historically deployed by Chicago
School critics of structural-era rules governing vertical agreements (which, in part, also
targeted exclusionary conduct): the argument that vertical contracts benefit competition
(e.g., by helping firms align incentives to prevent free riding and holdups) is not close to
the claim that monopoly fosters economic growth. On the other hand, the administrability arguments proffered by critics of the old rules governing vertical restraints (that
courts cannot easily craft a remedy and that judicial processes are too attentive to complaints from inefficient rivals) are similar to the last two economic arguments against
traditional monopolization doctrine, and the single monopoly profit argument is made in
both settings.
70
E.g., G.K.A. Beverage Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 767 (2d Cir. 1995); Town of
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23, 32 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.); seeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36-37 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
71Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
Justice Scalia's majority opinion can be read to claim that monopolies are temporary
(hence self-correcting), and that they foster economic growth (as the prospect of monopoly induces risk taking and innovation). Id. at 406. The opinion also highlights the risk of
false positives from Section 2 enforcement and, at least with respect to the violation alleged in the case, the difficulty of crafting relief to avoid ongoing judicial supervision
(both suggesting that courts cannot successfully address monopolization claims). Id. at
407-08, 414-15.
72
E.g., Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Competition Enforcement in an Innovative Economy (June 20, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/234246.htm.
73 Prominent monopolization decisions since 2000 expressly or implicitly rejecting
these arguments include United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005);
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
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(1) Monopoly power is often durable. Some markets may self-correct, but
economic theory suggests many reasons why monopoly power would not
be transitory, 74 and the case law offers examples of durable market
power,7 5 including in high-tech markets. 76 Accordingly, anticompetitive
monopolization is a serious concern.
(2) Competition, not monopoly, fosters economic growth. The empirical evidence demonstrates that market power is typically bad for innovation:
the push of competition generally spurs innovation and investment
more than the pull of monopoly. 77 "Dynamic competition" is no excuse
78
for allowing monopolization.
(3) Dominantfirms can often extend their market power through exclusionary
conduct. The single monopoly profit-argument holds only under narrow
conditions. More commonly, a dominant firm can exercise additional
power through exclusionary conduct that raises costs facing fringe rivals,
entrants, or that limits
sellers of more distant substitutes, or potential
79
the access of those firms to customers.
(4) Competition between a dominantfirm and inefficient rivals can be beneficial. Any rival, even an inefficient one, can constrain a dominant firm's
prices to some extent, limiting the dominant firm's exercise of monopoly power.80 Even a small and inefficient rival, moreover, can potentially

74See, e.g., Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?, 5 J. COML. & ECON. 249 (2008) (supracompetitive prices only attract entry efforts if they
.signal that the post-entry price would be high or that the incumbent firms have high costs,
and even then entry may not succeed in competing those prices down to competitive
levels). Indeed, exclusionary conduct by monopolists may erect entry barriers.
75
E.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Dentsply
Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
76 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
PETITION

77

Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74
L.J. 575, 583-86 (2007). Moreover, exclusionary conduct by dominant firms
may be directed particularly at innovative rivals.
7
s Jonathan B. Baker, "Dynamic Competition" Does Not Excuse Monopolization, COMPETITION
POL'V IsNr'L, Autumn 2008, at 243. Cf Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643,
649 (1980) (rejecting the argument that the potential for supracompetitive prices to induce entry could justify horizontal price fixing).
79 See generally Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 4; GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at
397-98, 417-18, 811-12, 861-65. Cf Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death
of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARv. L. REv. 397 (2009) (questioning application
of the "single monopoly profit" argument in the tying context).
80 See DOJ SECTION 2 REPORT, supra note 10, at 100 n.100 (citing Professors Elhauge
and Salop as making this argument). This point is also evident in the familiar model of a
dominant firm and competitive fringe.
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grow to challenge a dominant firm in the future, and it may have a leg
8
up on a de novo entrant in doing so. 1

(5) Monopolization cases do not present unique remedialproblems. The difficulties courts face in identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct
in monopolization cases are no more serious than those arising in other
settings, like mergers or anticompetitive agreements that are evaluated
under a reasonableness standard. 2 Many monopolization cases have involved exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm with no serious efficiencyjustification-a setting in which the harm to competition is not
confounded by procompetitive benefits. 83 Moreover, it makes little sense
to make judgments about the deterrent effect of present-day enforcement by reviewing the theories and remedies employed in earlier eras,
8 4
when legal standards and remedial approaches differed.
(6) Courts and enforcers are not routinely "captured"by rivals of dominant
firms. The claim that agencies and courts dance to the tune of rivals
assumes, implausibly, that less successful firms are better able to manipulate governmental processes than successful dominant firms, and is in
any case tantamount to supposing, without justification, that enforcers
bring cases and courts decide them based on the identities of the parties
rather than a review of the evidence. Moreover, it is no more difficult
for enforcers and courts to discount testimony for possible biases when
hearing from rivals as when hearing from dominant firms and clstomers-and all these sources of industry information can be helpful.
These counter-arguments present a strong rejoinder to the economic
policy arguments against monopolization enforcement. The arguments
against enforcement nevertheless offer a legitimate critique, and they*
have provided an economic underpinning for non-interventionist arguments made in the legal and political arenas.

81 See Gavil, supranote 44, at 35, 36 (an inefficient rival might be targeted for exclusion
by a dominant firm because the rival has the chance to become a more effective competitor, threatening the dominant firm's market power).
82 Nor are the difficulties more severe than those courts may face in applying the balancing standards of negligence law to business conduct.
83
E.g., Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); see generally Creighton et
al., supra note 4.
84 For example, the FTC's monopolization case against Xerox did "a world of good"
even if the firm had not engaged in bad acts sufficient to support a monopolization claim
by modern standards. See Willard K. Tom, The 1975 Xerox Consent Decree: Ancient Arifacts
and Current Tensions, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 967 (2001). And the Justice Department's famous
monopolization case against Standard Oil addressed a genuine competitive problem,
even if a modern court would have chosen a different remedy. See Granitz & Klein, supra
note 28.
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THE POLITICAL CRITIQUE

The modern political challenge to traditional monopolization standards arose in reaction to the government's monopolization case against
Microsoft. Microsoft ran afoul of antitrust enforcers because of its response to what the company's leader, Bill Gates, termed the "Internet
Tidal Wave." s5 At the start of the Internet era, Microsoft's Windows
software held a dominant position in operating systems for personal
computers. In 1998, the Clinton administration charged that Microsoft's
practices in marketing and designing its Internet browser harmed competition by thwarting a nascent challenge to Microsoft's Windows mo86
nopoly, with no other legitimate business purpose.
During the trial, the company offered both a legal defense and a separate public relations defense. Microsoft's legal defense centered around
its view that the operating system market was competitive, and that the
company's 90 percent market share would erode rapidly if a rival introduced a better operating system, notwithstanding the initial dearth of
7
compatible applications software.
Outside the courtroom, the firm went farther, questioning antitrust
itself. In its public relations efforts, Microsoft described the government's monopolization case as an attack on its core business freedom to
develop new technology and distribute it broadly to consumers.
Microsoft claimed specifically that the litigation threatened the company's "freedom to innovate,"88 as if to claim it had a right to do as it
pleases, particularly with respect to the use of its intellectual property,
letting the competition chips fall as they may. 9 In addition, Microsoft
depicted the Justice Department as the pawn of its rivals, which, it said,
had turned to the government for help when they were unable to suc-

85 Bill Gates, The Internet Tidal Wave (May 26, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/cases/exhibits/20.pdf.
86 See generally Melamed & Rubinfeld, supra note 15.
87 See, e.g., Direct Testimony of Richard L. Schmalensee, United States v. Microsoft (Jan.
11, 1999) (economic expert for Microsoft), as reprinted in GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at
953-64.
88 Ads in Newspapers Take Microsofts Case to Its Users, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 9, 1998, http://
community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date= 19980409&slug=2744284.
Microsoft's "Freedom to Innovate Network" still has an online presence, at http://www.
microsoft.com/freedomtoinnovate/default.aspx.
89In a nod toward this political argument, Microsoft claimed in the court case that any
exclusionary conduct that took the form of restrictions on software licensing were legally
justified because the company was simply exercising its rights as the holder of valid copyrights. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting this
argument).
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ceed in the market. 90 Microsoft also lobbied Congress to cut the Justice
Department's antitrust enforcement budget. 9'
Through these steps, Microsoft provoked a high-profile public challenge to the legitimacy of antitrust and antitrust institutions. 92 Microsoft
charged that antitrust undermines economic rights and facilitates inefficient rent seeking by rivals and it questioned whether the antitrust laws
should ever govern firm behavior in high-tech markets.
Microsoft's challenge gained political traction during the 2000 presidential election campaign between Bush and Gore. In the midst of the
campaign, the federal district court judge hearing the case found that
Microsoft had violated the antitrust laws and, at the Clinton administration's request, ordered that the firm be broken in two. 93 The Republican
presidential candidate, George W. Bush, signaled his opposition and
perhaps his sympathy for Microsoft's "freedom to innovate" argument.
At a campaign appearance in Washington State, Microsoft's home, Bush
expressed concern "if this company were to be broken apart, this engine
of change, engine of growth [ .... ]-94 Senator Slade Gorton, the Washington State Republican running a close but ultimately losing race for
re-election, signaled that if Bush were elected, the case would be re95
solved favorably to Microsoft.
The breakup order was placed on hold while the D.C. Circuit reviewed the case. In recognition of the importance of the case, and to
forestall an expedited direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Microsoft's
appeal was considered, unusually, by the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc. 96
90E.g., A Case of Trial in Error: The Microsoft Antitrust Lawsuit (Dec. 7,1998), http://
www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/1998/12-7trialdoc.mspx.
91Dan Morgan & Juliet Eilperin, Microsoft Targets Fundingfor Antitrust Office, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al, reprinted at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/oct/15/business/fi-22481.
92The monopolization litigation involving Microsoft captured the interest of the public
in a way that few antitrust cases ever do. For perhaps only the second time in history, the
U.S. government asked a court to break up a leading firm in a rapidly growing, cuttingedge industry run by the wealthiest person in the world. The other decision involved
Standard Oil, controlled by John D. Rockefeller. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221
U.S. 1 (1911).
93Melamed & Rubinfeld, supra note 15, at 293.
94Mike Allen, Bush Hints He Would Not Have Prosecuted Microsoft, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/pmextra/febOO/28/A43853-2000Feb28.
html.
95SeeJohn

Hendren, Microsoft, Employees Throw Support to Gorton, SEAT-LE

TIMES,

Nov. 5,

2000, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20001105&slug=TfG
027QA2; cf.Donald Lambro, Bush Camp Sees Him Saving Microsoft, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2000, at A4.
96SeeJohn Hendren, Appeals Court Ready to Hear Microsoft, SEATrLE TIMES, June 14, 2000,
http://community.seatdetimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000614&slug4026564.
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The most important vote on the appeals court was likely that of Judge
Douglas Ginsburg. 7 Ginsburg is both an antitrust expert and a regulation skeptic.98 If the courts were going to mount a broad non-interventionist challenge to antitrust enforcement, Judge Ginsburg was the
obvious intellectual leader to frame the critique. Judge Ginsburg instead
became competition's champion. His decision not to dissent plausibly
allowed the case to be decided unanimously rather than by a narrow
majority, heading off Microsoft's efforts to use this high-profile litigation
to undermine the legitimacy of antitrust enforcement.
It is possible to imagine a counterfactual opinion-perhaps a majority
opinion or perhaps a dissent-sympathetic to Microsoft's "freedom to
innovate" argument. The opinion would have restated the six non-interventionist economic policy arguments, adapting them to a high-tech
context. It would have claimed that antitrust law has evolved to address a
concern for chilling innovation, particularly by exempting the application of antitrust rules to the development of new products.9 9 Based upon
97Ginsburg may be best known today for his unsuccessful Supreme Court nomination.
He was credited with coining the phrase "Constitution in exile" to capture the nostalgia
on the right for the way the Supreme Court enshrined economic rights a century ago,
although a conservative commentator, Randy Barnett, denies that there is a "constitution
in exile" movement. See generally Debate Club, LEGAL ArrAiRs, May 2, 2005, http://www.
legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub-cie0505.msp. Cf Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2002-2003 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 7 (2003), http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/
2003/constitutional.pdf (criticizing New Deal-era decisions of the Supreme Court for lack
of fidelity to the witten Constitution).
98 Ginsburg served as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust during the Reagan administration. Although he tends to be skeptical of government challenges to exclusionary
conduct, he supports antitrust challenges to price-fixing cartels and to horizontal mergers
that create highly concentrated markets. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust as Antimonopoly, 14 REGULATION 91, 100 (1991), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regvl4n3/vl4n3-9.pdf. On the D.C. Circuit, he wrote an antitrust opinion
upholding an FT'C decision challenging an agreement among rivals to divide markets.
PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Another antitrust expert on
the circuit court, Merrick Garland, did not participate in the en banc review, presumably
because of his earlier service at the Justice Department.
9 For support, the hypothetical opinion could have relied upon a Supreme Court decision affirming a lower court decision that exempted developing industries from the traditional per se prohibition against tying in order to allow new firms to develop a reputation
for quality-United States v. JerroldElectronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); a Court decision holding that price fixing is not illegal
per se when the agreement allowed them to create a new product-Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); and a series of appellate decisions
arguably establishing that the introduction of a new product cannot be the basis for a
Section 2 violation unless the new product offers no benefit to buyers and instead purely
operates to raise compatibility problems for rivals-Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); Transamerica Computer Corp. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1963); Northeastern Telephone Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981). The hypothetical opinion might also have cited the routine acceptance by the antitrust enforcement
agencies of the development of better and cheaper products as a justification for what
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these economic and legal observations, the opinion would have concluded that antitrust law strongly presumes that competition and consumers benefit from unilateral conduct or vertical agreements entered
into by firms in rapidly changing high-tech markets. It would have found
for defendant Microsoft by applying this presumption to evaluate the
specific claims of anticompetitive tying, exclusive dealing, and monopolization at issue in the case.
If this analysis had been at the core of the majority opinion in the
D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court that later decided Trinko'00 may well
have affirmed it. The result would have been to establish the principle
that the antitrust laws do not apply in cutting-edge industries beyond
the prohibition against horizontal collusion and perhaps the bar on anticompetitive horizontal mergers. Such an outcome would have taken a
large step down the road toward abolishing concern with exclusionary
conduct from the antitrust laws altogether.
In the actual case, the appellate decision, handed down in mid-2001,
was unanimous and nothing like the hypothetical opinion sketched
above. 101 Doctrinally, the D.C. Circuit employed a structured reasonable10 2
ness standard consistent with traditional monopolization precedents.
Applying this test, the court agreed that Microsoft had acted improperly
to maintain its dominant position in operating systems software by engaging in the marketing practices challenged by the government. l03 But
the court rejected some peripheral monopolization violations identified
by the trial court and sent the case back to the district court to reconsider the remedy.
Within the four corners of the legal dispute, both sides could claim a
victory. On the one hand, the appeals court strongly affirmed the Justice
Department's pursuit of the case. On the other hand, Microsoft benemight otherwise be an anticompetitive merger or joint venture. U.S. Dep't of Justice &
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 (2006),
available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm.
100 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
101United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
102 See supra text at note 39. Although commentators advocating the "no economic
sense" test treat the Microsoft decision as offering support for their views, the decision is
better understood as setting forth a structured reasonableness test for Sherman Act Section 2 analogous to the approach applied under Section 1. This is evident in a comparison of the Microsoft decision with another decision of the same court, Polygram Holding,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See GAVIL ET AL., supra note
18, at 202-11 (Sidebar 2-5) (discussing how the rule of reason has been structured in
agreement cases).
103 The court dismissed Microsoft's primary copyright defense-the legal analogue of its
"freedom to innovate" claim-as an argument that "borders upon the frivolous." Microsoft,
253 F.3d at 63.
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fited because the case was not resolved until after the Bush administration took office. A Gore administration would likely have been tough on
Microsoft in order to restore competition. The Bush administration instead gave Microsoft a generous settlement, with only limited restrictions on the company's conduct1

4

On the outside-the-courthouse question of the legitimacy of antitrust
enforcement, by contrast, the pro-antitrust outcome was clear and powerful. In its wake, Microsoft's public relations attack on the legitimacy of
antitrust has never gained traction.
One way it might have, but did not, is through the Supreme Court's
a 05
2004 decision in Trinko.
In that case, a class of local telephone service
customers alleged that Verizon, an incumbent local exchange carrier,
had protected its monopoly prices from erosion by denying interconnection services to entrants seeking to offer competing local telephone
service. Verizon was obligated to provide new entrants with interconnection services under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court held that Verizon's unilateral refusal to assist its
rivals did not state a claim under the Sherman Act.
Trinko can be read narrowly, 0 6 as precluding monopolization liability
in a setting in which a separate statutory scheme provided for extensive
regulation aimed at promoting competition. 07 But the sweeping rhetoric of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court allows for a broader reading
that adopts some of the arguments in the economic policy critique of
the law governing monopolization through non-price exclusionary conduct and hints at the political critique.0 18 Had Microsoft come out differ104The settlement's terms were what one might expect from an enforcer skeptical about
the case, and perhaps sympathetic to Microsoft's broad out-of-the-courthouse attack on
antitrust, who made a good-faith effort to resolve the case consistent with the law. See
Charles A. James, The Real Microsoft Case and Settlement, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 58. Not
surprisingly, though ironically, given that the government had prevailed in court, the
settlement was championed by those most critical of the government's case and criticized
by the case's strongest supporters.
105540 U.S. 398.
106See Nobody v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1112-14 (D.
Colo. 2004) (limiting Trinko to regulated industry settings); but seeJohn Doe 1 v. Abbott
Labs., 571 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Trinko and linkLine outside the regulated
industries context).
107The statute incorporated specific mechanisms for promoting competition by requiring incumbent monopolists to deal with entrants.
10sJustice Scalia stated:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the freemarket system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short
period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. ....
Firms may acquire mo-
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ently, Trinko might have gone farther to question the legitimacy of the
antitrust bar on monopolization.
Another way Microsoft's public relations attack on antitrust might
have gained traction, but did not, is through the deliberations of the
Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC). Congressman James Sensenbrenner, then the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced the legislation that led eventually to the creation of the AMC
the day before the D.C. Circuit released its en banc decision on liability
in the government's monopolization case against Microsoft.0 9 Sensenbrenner framed for AMC consideration several issues that arose in the
Microsoft litigation,"' all likely familiar to the AMC Commissioners."'
nopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely
suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of
their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law,
since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest
in those economically beneficial facilities.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08.
109Act to establish the Antitrust Modernization Commission, H.R. 2215 (2001) (introduced June 27, 2001) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 107-273 on Nov. 2, 2002). The text of the
statute is available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/pdf/statute/amc-act.pdf.
110When Congressman Sensenbrenner introduced his bill, he indicated that he wanted
the AMC to investigate the role of intellectual property law in antitrust law, how antitrust
enforcement should change in the global economy, and the role of state attorneys general in enforcing antitrust laws. Press Release, Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Sensenbrenner Introduces
Antitrust Study Commission Legislation (June 27, 2001), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/legacy/news_062701.htm. At the AMC's first public hearing in 2004, which
took place in the hearing room of the House Judiciary Committee, Chairman Sensenbrenner amplified on these ideas. On the first, he wanted the antitrust laws "calibrated" to
reflect an "increasingly information-driven digital economy." On the second, he was concerned about subjecting U.S. firms to conflicting enforcement regimes abroad. He specifically noted the EU's investigation of Microsoft, and called on foreign enforcers to
exercise comity in order to avoid unfair and discriminatory treatment of U.S. firms. On
the third, he raised the problem of inconsistent federal and state antitrust standards.
These three problems were salient for Chairman Sensenbrenner at least in part because
they came up in the Microsoft antitrust litigation. Any case of this magnitude almost necessarily would raise important questions about antitrust law and policy, so it is not surprising
that those questions framed a broader public debate. In his 2004 charge to the AMC,
Chairman Sensenbrenner added two more issues that were probably not suggested specifically by the Microsoft case. He was worried that international trade agencies like the WTO
might supplant the antitrust agencies, particularly with respect to harmonizing the antitrust and intellectual property laws, and he was concerned about the circumvention of the
antitrust laws through exemptions for regulated industries. Transcript of July 15, 2004
Meeting, Antitrust Modernization Commission (testimony of Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/pdf/meetings/040715_Meeting_
Transcript~reform.pdf.
"' Many of the AMC's Commissioners had thought about some or all of Chairman Sensenbrenner's issues in connection with the Microsoft case itself. The Commission's Chair
was a long-time partner of one of Microsoft's chief outside lawyers, and its members included Microsoft's lead trial attorney, a formerJustice Department official who had been
intimately involved in negotiating the government's settlement with Microsoft (who left
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One was suggestive of Microsoft's "freedom to innovate" argument: Sensenbrenner wanted the antitrust laws "calibrated" to reflect an "increas2
ingly information-driven digital economy.""
When the AMC began its work, it asked for public comment on its
agenda. It received responses from all over the political spectrum. Some
commentators wanted more enforcement. Others echoed Microsoft's
freedom to innovate critique. For example, conservative activist Grover
Norquist, President of Americans for Tax Reform, wrote that "it seems
clear that the antitrust laws, if they ever served a useful purpose, now
only exist to stifle productivity growth and development of new products
and services."" 3
If the D.C. Circuit had split in the Microsoft case, with one opinion
endorsing the freedom to innovate critique along the lines previously
sketched and the Bush Justice Department seemingly endorsing that critique through its settlement with Microsoft, it is easy to imagine the
AMC accepting invitations to recommend substantial changes to the antitrust laws in order to limit their scrutiny of high-tech firms like
Microsoft. As matters actually transpired, though, the D.C. Circuit's
unanimous decision on liability undermined Microsoft's legitimacy critique, and Microsoft itself no longer pressed that position once it settled
with the government. Even if some AMC members would have liked to
give the freedom to innovate critique a sympathetic hearing, therefore,
the AMC had only limited political space to do so. 114 Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the AMC chose not to push for wholesale change. Its final report.endorsed the current approach to antitrust
enforcement and suggested only limited reforms.
the AMC before its report issued), a former senior staffer for a leading Senate critic of
Microsoft, and an economic consultant who had worked for Microsoft's rivals. The other
Commissioners had comparable antitrust expertise. Cf Jonathan Krim, A Less Public Path
to Changes in Antitrust, WASH. PosT, May 12, 2005, at El.
112Transcript of July 15, 2004 Meeting, supra note 110, at 5.
11
3 Americans for Tax Reform, Comments Regarding Commission Issues for Study (filed
before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Sept. 9, 2004) (letter signed by Grover
G. Norquist), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/comments/americanstaxreform.pdf.
114 At the AMC hearings on exclusionary conduct, Charles (Rick) Rule, a former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, an outside counsel for Microsoft, and a leading critic
of monopolization enforcement, declared that "in a perfect world," Section 2 could probably be repealed, but that as "a political realist" he recognized that that was not possible.
Rule instead offered ten suggestions for modifying monopolization doctrine which, if accepted, would collectively mean "there wouldn't be a lot of behavior that would be caught
by Section 2." Transcript of Sept. 19, 2005 Hearing on Exclusionary Conduct 13, Antitrust
Modernization Commission, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission
_hearings/pdf/050929_ExclusConductTranscriptreform.pdf. Professor Steven C.
Salop, a leading defender of monopolization enforcement, responded that Rule sought
to fix antitrust "in more or less the way I fixed our cat." Id. at 42.
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The political critique of monopolization enforcement has little traction today. By contrast, the economic and legal policy critiques remain
the subject of a lively debate.
II. PRESERVING A POLITICAL BARGAIN
The three non-interventionist critiques of monopolization standards
and enforcement, and the debates they have provoked, provide a window into the political economy of antitrust. This Part interprets those
critiques as a challenge to a political bargain reached during the 1940s
by which competition was adopted as national economic policy in preference to regulation or laissez-faire.
From this vantage point, the non-interventionist critics may have
more than one motive. For some, the main objective is probably to reform the competition policy bargain in order to increase the efficiency
gains to the economy, on the model of what occurred with respect to
other areas of antitrust doctrine during antitrust's Chicago School
revolution. For others, the point may be to use the monopolization debate as a wedge to overturn the competition policy bargain, as part of a
broader attack on the post-New Deal regulatory state.
A.

COMPETITION POLICY AS A POLITICAL BARGAIN

A simple political economy interpretation of the non-interventionist
challenge to monopolization standards and enforcement might view
dominant firm defendants as concentrated political interests."5 As powerful political players, dominant firms may be peculiarly able to overcome the collective action problems that make it difficult to change
antitrust law, and so achieve political influence over the regulatory
scheme.
This simple theory is not persuasive, however. Antitrust enforcement
is substantially insulated from capture because it implements a regulatory scheme of broad applicability, not an industry-specific one." 6 More115
One public choice perspective views the Sherman Act as the product of majoritarian
politics, legislated in a setting in which the benefits and costs of governmental action are
both widely distributed. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF RECULATION 367 (1980). This
interpretation has been questioned by other public choice scholars who emphasize the
role of agricultural interests in the law's enactment. Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Antitrust

Before the Sherman Act, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC

CHOICE PERSPECTrVE 255 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shugart II eds., 1995).
116The possibility of capture is also reduced by the requirement that the Justice Department prove its case in court. The Federal Trade Commission can try its cases administratively, subject to appellate review, but must similarly go to court to secure a preliminary
injunction against a challenged merger. Although Congress has created a number of antitrust exemptions to favor specific industries, the antitrust rules established by the courts
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over, it is unlikely that dominant firms, which may be subject to
monopolization enforcement, have more political power than industries
as a whole, which may be subject to cartel enforcement-at least if the
industry can plausibly solve its collective action problems, as may be the
case for an industry with an oligopoly structure or an active trade association. In addition, the suggestion that dominant firms have particular
political influence on antitrust enforcers or courts is at odds with the
concern by non-interventionists that the enforcement agencies and
courts are overly responsive to the complaints of unsuccessful and inefficient rivals to dominant firms.
The non-interventionist critiques are better interpreted against the
background of a more complex political economy analysis of antitrust
enforcement centered around the idea that large and diffuse interest
groups in the United States reached an informal political bargain embracing antitrust by the middle of the 20th century.'17 The "bargain"
terminology may mislead to the extent it appears to suggest an explicit
deal between organized political factions. Instead, the bargain should be
understood as an informal political understanding that bridges an historically important political cleavage over the role of the government in
regulating large firms. Framing this political outcome as a bargain highlights the problems of reaching and policing such an understanding.
Who are the parties to the bargain?The national policy of competition
can be interpreted as a coordinated arrangement between two large and
diffuse interest groups, here "consumers" (a group that historically also
included farmers and small business) and producers (large firms)." 8
are generally applied in a similar way across industries. According to two former senior
FFC officials, however, the oil industry is an exception. Timothy J. Muris & Richard G.
Parker, A Dozen Facts You Should Know About Antitrust and the Oil Industry 5 (June
2007), available at http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/ecw4z24weaarlxr4y4owljh
spsc4melp4frhuazd5ppvkte5zvy6ngoyaegioeds3fjoaxat53gqz7s3v57gl3tte/070625oilreport.pdf ("The petroleum industry receives closer scrutiny from antitrust authorities than
any other industry.").
117See generally Baker, Political Bargain, supra note 40. Cf Kovacic, Enforcement Norms,
supra note 6 (highlighting continuities in antitrust policy independent of the political
party in power).
I18 Baker, Political Bargain,supra note 40, at 519-22. The underlying model assumes that
a diffuse interest group, such as consumers or producers, can more easily solve its collective action problems under conditions of adversity than success, and that a diffuse interest
group that succeeds politically would be unable to lock in its success permanently by
making it difficult for its unsuccessful rival interest group to mobilize in the future. Under
such circumstances, the one-shot political interaction between producers and consumers
would lead to regulatory cycles: if one group gets the upper hand, and can introduce
policies that appropriate rents from the other group, that outcome motivates the losing
group to mobilize its political resources more effectively and overturn the undesirable
regulatory regime. An efficiency-enhancing competition policy bargain is possible in this
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These groups have potentially adverse interests. If either is able to control the political process, it would pick a regulatory policy that shifts
rents away from the other group: consumers would regulate large firms
and redistribute their rents, while producers would adopt a laissez-faire
policy that permits firms to exercise market power." 9 A political equilibrium that maximizes the joint surplus of the actors-here achieving the
efficiency gains from selecting competition enforcement as national policy in preference to regulation or laissez-faire-is not inevitable. 20 But it
can arise if the interest groups recognize that their political interaction
is ongoing, 2' as plausibly occurred with the competition policy bargain
reached during the mid-20th century.
How was the bargain reached? In brief summary, for many decades
before the 1940s, big business had fought for a non-interventionist policy of self-regulation while consumer, farmer, and small business interests advocated regulatory alternatives. This dispute was a central
domestic policy issue in the 1912 presidential election and during the
Great Depression, for example. The tussle between these coalitions
meant that regulatory policy shifted unstably between pro-consumer
and pro-business positions.
During the 1940s, these interest groups collectively accepted an intermediate, antitrust-focused approach to business regulation that gave
close scrutiny to firm conduct in concentrated markets without engagsetup if consumers and producers come to recognize that they interact politically in repeated play.
119The division of the polity into two broad groups, consumers and producers, ignores
the difficulty of classifying individuals who see themselves as consumers at home but identify with producer interests at work, and the difficulty classifying firms that are sellers in
their output markets but buyers in their input markets. It also downplays important distinctions within each group (such as the different interests among consumers, farmers,
and small business within the "consumer" interest group), and puts aside the division
between those in the consumer interest group who sought to restore competition by
breaking up large firms and those who sought to domesticate large firms through governmental supervision and planning. Notwithstanding these qualifications, the Populist and
Progressive accounts of domestic politics as a struggle between the people and the interests captures an important aspect of historical debates over economy-wide regulatory policy. See generally id. at 495-98.
120 In the model, neither interest group would select antitrust over its preferred outcome in a one-shot interaction, notwithstanding the possibility of also appropriating the
resulting efficiency gains because it would be difficult for each interest group to mobilize
politically in favor of that more complex outcome to the extent that doing so would require downplaying the sense of grievance. (Analogously, cartels typically exercise market
power by reducing output below the competitive level, notwithstanding the theoretical
possibility that they could sell more and appropriate some of the efficiency gains, for
example, through complex pricing, such as a two-part tariff.)
121 Id. The application of the Folk Theorem presumes either an infinitely repeated political interaction or, perhaps more plausibly, a finitely repeated interaction with uncertain
termination.
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ing in ongoing regulatory supervision or systematically sacrificing the
efficiencies of the large firm form of business enterprise. 22 Each interest
group gave up its preferred policy in reaching a political accommoda123
tion that allowed them to share the efficiency gains from competition.
A political debate that had for decades seemed incapable of resolution
began to fade in salience. By 1964 historian Richard Hofstatder could
describe the antitrust movement as "one of the faded passions of Ameri1 24
can reform."
What are the terms of the political bargain? The political bargain can be
described in broad strokes. It rejected national economic planning and
direct economic regulation of large firms on the one hand, and a handsoff governmental role on the other hand, in favor of a general policy of
fostering and protecting competition. 125 Because the bargain was
reached informally, "competition" was not defined with contractual pre122 The unhappy experience with the National Recovery Administration during the
1930s had placed advocates of industrial self-regulation and those favoring broad governmental planning on the political defensive. When the impetus to regulate big business
became more urgent with the recession of 1938, Thurman Arnold, appointed in 1938 to
lead the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, reinvigorated antitrust enforcement with
an approach that gave close scrutiny to firms in concentrated markets without engaging
in ongoing regulatory supervision or forcing the firms to sacrifice scale and scope economies. This approach was accepted by the courts during the 1940s and by Congress when it
toughened the anti-merger statute in 1950, and the enforcement norms established then
continue to shape competition policy today. See generally Baker, Political Bargain, supra
note 40, at 501-02. Cf Anne Mayhew, How American Economists Came to Love the Sherman
Antitrust Act, in FROM INTERWAR PLURALISM TO POSTWAR NEOCLASSICISM 179 (Mary S. Morgan & Malcolm Rutherford eds., 1998) (professional economists were unenthusiastic'
about the Sherman Act in 1890 but embraced it by the end of the 1930s). Two alternative
explanations for the decline in political salience of regulatory policy since the 1940spost-World War II prosperity and the Cold War political competition between the U.S.
and U.S.S.R-are considered in Baker, supra, at 504 n.80.
123 This outcome was not inevitable, as political institutions do not necessarily evolve to
capture efficiency gains. See generally Baker, supra note 40, at 492-93.
124 Richard

Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement? in THE

PARANOID STYLE

188 (1979 reprint). Similarly, antitrust had first
appeared in political party platforms in 1888 and was routinely endorsed every four years
thereafter for a century. But it largely disappeared from those platforms after 1988. Baker,
PoliticalBargain, supra note 40, at 503.
125 The adoption of a competition policy bargain did not lead to the immediate deregulation of those sectors of the economy that had been subject to ongoing regulatory supervision-transportation, financial services, electric power, and communications. But the
deregulation movement that began during the 1980s followed its logic by narrowing regulation in these sectors to more closely mirror the scope of likely natural monopolies
(where competition is not feasible). The competition policy bargain did not affect the
legitimacy of economic regulation intended to address market failures, such as externalities (like pollution), provision of public goods, natural monopoly, problems with markets
arising from asymmetric information (such as moral hazard and adverse selection), or the
high transactions costs of coordination and standard-setting. Nor did it affect the legitimacy of social insurance.
IN AMERICAN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS
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cision. Its contours were reflected in the antitrust approach accepted
during the 1940s by all three branches of the federal government: the
United States would supervise closely large firms in concentrated industries through case-by-case antitrust enforcement rather than relying on
business self-regulation, active and ongoing regulatory supervision, or
systematic industrial restructuring that might sacrifice scale and scope
economies. 126 Antitrust rules can thus be understood as institutions developed to define, protect, and enforce the political bargain (including
the ability to reform the bargain, as occurred in response to Chicago
School critiques of structural era rules).
Yet the political bargain does not determine closely the specifics of
the doctrinal rules. The antitrust rules developed by the Supreme Court
during the 1980s are on the whole consistent with it, but more interventionist rules would also be largely consistent with the bargain, 27 and, in
antitrust, the courts have generally been assigned the institutional role
of specifying the details. This allows the bargain to change over time,
most notably during the Chicago School revolution. In general, the new
rules developed by the Supreme Court then removed impediments to
efficiency-enhancing business conduct. But in protecting producers
from overly stringent antitrust rules, the Court pushed the rules so that
they now approach the non-interventionist edge of the permissible
28
spectrum. 1
How was the bargain modified? Political debate returned with a shift in
antitrust policy during the late 1970s and 1980s. During that period, the
Supreme Court revised many if not most aspects of antitrust law along
the lines suggested by legal and economic commentators loosely associated with the University of Chicago. 29 The antitrust laws changed dra126 See generally Baker,

PoliticalBargain,supra note 40, at 501-02. "To an important extent
the antitrust enforcement norms established then-particularly the objection to horizontal price fixing and to mergers leading to troublesome levels of market concentration-continue to shape competition policy today." Id. at 502.
127A set of more interventionist rules, likely also in large part consistent with the politi...

cal bargain, has been proposed by the American Antitrust Institute. AMERICAN

ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.

org/archives/transitionreport.ashx.
128 Cf Baker, PoliticalBargain, supranote 40, at 519-22 (present-day enforcers and courts
should be more concerned about the possibility that antitrust rules might become so noninterventionist as to permit the exercise of market power, and so undermine consumer
confidence that competition is superior to regulation and redistribution, than about the
reverse possibility that the antitrust laws are so stringent as to lead producers to favor
scrapping the political bargain).
12 See generally Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, supra note 26. The breadth of
doctrinal change is underscored by Judge Douglas Ginsburg's comment that the law governing tying was the "last man standing." Douglas H. Ginsburg, Judge, U.S. Court of Ap-
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matically but not fundamentally. To a substantial extent, the shift in
antitrust doctrine-during the 1980s reflected a bipartisan consensus in
favor of reforming antitrust rules to enhance the efficiency gains arising
from competition policy.130 Under this interpretation, antitrust's Chicago School revolution reaffirms, rather than undermines, the view that
the United States had by 1950 adopted competition policy as a political
bargain.131
How is the bargainenfowed? The competition policy bargain is enforced
in two senses. Its terms are enforced narrowly through the application of
antitrust rules to resolve disputes-that is, in the day-to-day prosecutorial efforts of government agencies and private plaintiffs and in the
decisions of the courts. The bargain is enforced more broadly when antitrust rules change, as political actors evaluate and respond to those
developments to ensure that the modified set of rules remains within a
range consistent with relying on competition rather than substituting
business self-regulation or close regulatory supervision. If those political
constraints fail, modifications to antitrust standards may undermine the
bargain. Otherwise, modifications may implement it or improve it.
B. WHY MIGHT A POLITIcAL BARGAIN CHANGE?
From an economic point of view, the political bargain over competition policy-an informal political d6tente between producers and con-

peals for the D.C. Circuit, Remarks at the Luncheon Roundtable Discussion with Federal
Court of Appeal Judges, ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting (Mar. 25, 2009).
130 These years saw controversy within the antitrust field over how to revise the rules, but
also general recognition that structural-era antitrust rules frequently sacrificed beneficial
production efficiencies and would benefit from reform. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 1.3 at 7 (2d ed.
2006) ("By the mid-1970s, a sense that some court decisions had suppressed conduct that
was efficient and the contemporaneous growth in influence of the Chicago School of
Economics began tempering enforcemeni policy."). Cf Thomas E. Kauper, Influence of
Conservative Economic Analysis on the Development of the Law of Antitrust, in How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALvsIS ON

U.S. ANTITRUST 40, 42-44 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (while Chicago criticisms of the
antitrust doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s were influential in bringing about change,
those doctrines were often easy targets for ridicule and were also criticized by a number of
influential non-Chicagoans, such as Phillip Areeda, Donald Turner, and Robert Pitofsky).
131 Baker, Political Bargain, supra note 40, at 505-15. That is, antitrust's Chicago School
revolution is better understood as reform of the antitrust laws to increase the efficiency
gains from competition and to avoid the possibility that the political bargain would become disadvantageous for producers, or else as a thwarted attempt by producers to renege on that political bargain, rather than as a successful attempt by producers to induce
the political system to discard competition policy in favor of a pro-producer regulatory
regime permitting the exercise of market power.
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sumers-raises enforcement problems similar to those facing a cartel.
That is, the parties to the bargain may see an opportunity to profit by
cheating-here manipulating the political system to transform antitrust
rules so they no longer foster efficient firm behavior but instead permit
the exercise of market power (producer cheating) or implement redistributive regulation (consumer cheating). To preserve the competition
policy bargain, the political system must prevent those changes in the
rules that would undermine the bargain in this way, much as a cartel
must prevent cheating by its members.

The cartel analogy suggests three reasons why the outcome of the
competition policy bargain-particularly the standards developed to implement the bargain in applying the antitrust laws-might change
under pressure from non-interventionists, the primary source of recent
criticism of monopolization standards. First, rule changes made under
non-interventionist pressure might reflect producer cheating, by which
large firms foster changes in the rules consistent with the bargain breaking down. Second, the terms of the bargain might, from the start, incorporate variations in doctrinal rules or enforcement standards that favor
producers when necessary to prevent cheating by large firms (thereby
ensuring that cheating never occurs). Finally, pro-producer changes in
the rules might reflect renegotiation of the terms of the bargain to enhance the gains to both parties by removing impediments to procompetitive producer behavior. These possible interpretations of the early 21st
century .controversy over monopolization standards and enforcement
policy are evaluated in turn.
1. PoliticalMobilization to Overturn the Competition Policy Bargain
First, the terms of the bargain may change because the agreement has
broken down or is breaking down. 33 One of the interest groups that is a
132See id. The similarity between the enforcement problems facing the political bargain
and cartels makes the long duration of the political bargain (now into its second halfcentury) appear unsurprising: though some cartel agreements are very short lived, others
last for decades. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Wat Determines Cartel Success?
44J. ECON. LIT. 43, 49-57 (2006). The DeBeers diamond cartel has lasted more than a
century.
133 It is no surprise that the political bargain adopting competition policy has remained
in force for decades, notwithstanding difficulties in achieving cooperative outcomes of
multi-party prisoner's dilemmas and enforcing those outcomes to prevent cheating . Cf
Avinash Dixit, Governance Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (2009)
(highlighting such problems). These difficulties tend to be avoided in enforcing the competition policy bargain for several reasons. First, the dynamic equilibrium that can be
achieved through repeated play of a prisoner's dilemma is self-enforcing, so long as the
external environment does not change. Second, the producer and consumer groups that
reached the bargain would be expected to have difficulty mobilizing politically to cheat,
because of the problems inherent in solving the collective action problems facing a large

2010]

PRESERVING A POLITICAL BARGAIN

635

party to the political bargain-here, large firms that might prefer that
the nation switch to a laissez-faire framework-may cheat by mobilizing
political support for a change in the rules, leading the bargain to
34
collapse.
If cheating by large firms were to occur, one would expect to observe
a broad political mobilization of actors associated with producer interests in support of efforts to reject existing competition policy rules like
the monopolization standards that are now the focus of controversy.
Such a mobilization would likely influence multiple government institutions, particularly those on the front lines in implementing the political
bargain. 3 5 At the federal level, one might expect to see reduced enforcement by the Antitrust Division or the FTC, Justice Department advocacy of non-interventionist views before the courts through amicus
briefs, Congress employing oversight of the enforcement agencies and
courts to question the scope of traditional rules, congressional action to
cut enforcement agency budgets or limit or repeal the current antitrust
rules, or the Supreme Court reaching out to take monopolization cases
136
in order to limit or overturn monopolization rules.
and diffuse group. And if one interest group threatened to overturn the bargain, that
would encourage counter-mobilization by the opposing interest group. See generally Baker,
Political Bargain, supra note 40, at 487-90. Third, the institutions involved in implementing the political bargain are often slow to change and may have a stake in the bargain's
success.
134The possibility that the bargain might be renegotiated after its collapse can be
thought of as change through renegotiation, which is discussed below.
135A sustained political mobilization would likely be required, moreover, in order to
achieve change. Although antitrust's Chicago School revolution ultimately served to reform the competition policy bargain, rather than overthrow it, Congress and the states
exhibited suspicion as to whether the proposed reforms were undermining the bargain
and slowed the Chicago tide in some areas. Id. at 501-10. In 1984, for example, Congress
limited the Assistant Attorney General's ability to argue in court for discarding the per se
rule against resale price maintenance, thereby signaling its displeasure to both the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court. The result was that the Court, abetted by the Executive, narrowed the per se rule in various ways without discarding it. The rule was not
overturned until 2008. See generally GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 370-75.
136 Cf Baker, Political Bargain, supra note 40, at 506-08 (similar features characterized
the transition from antitrust's structural era to its Chicago School era). If the political
bargain has broken down because producer interests have chosen to renege, it may also
be possible to understand why the producers found cheating worthwhile. One possibility
is a change in the payoffs that lowers the producer share of the efficiency gains from
competition policy or raises the producer gains from the exercise of market power. Another is an increase in the discount rate that leads producers to act in a present-oriented
way (and thus to ignore the possibility' that their success in overturning the competition
bargain would engender a countervailing mobilization by consumers to regulate the large
firms). A third possibility is that the producer coalition has been captured by a subgroup
that favors reneging (perhaps monopolists under investigation), in a setting where collective action problems limit the ability of those large firms that favor continuation of the
competition policy bargain from stopping the minority.
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A case can be made for this interpretation of the recent controversy
over monopolization standards by placing that dispute in a broader context. If the legal, economic, and political critiques of monopolization
law reflect a political mobilization by business interests to overturn the
competition policy bargain in favor of laissez-faire, antitrust is probably
not the primary arena for that political contest. Antitrust is more likely a
secondary battleground in a larger effort by some conservative political
interests, perhaps including the large businesses that might care about
monopolization," 7 to undo the regulatory and social insurance programs created during the New Deal.
This broader political controversy can be briefly sketched. 38 Although
some economic conservatives have never accepted the legitimacy of New
Deal policy innovations, those programs had become entrenched by the
1950s, even in the Republican Party, the most common political home
for critics of government involvement in the economy. 39 Then the economy went sour. Between 1973 and 1984, the United States experienced
inflation, an energy shortage, three recessions, new competition from
foreign manufacturers in lower wage nations, slowed productivity
growth, and sluggish income growth for workers. This decade of eco-,
nomic stagnation arrived in the wake of the Civil Rights movement and
new rules to protect the environment and worker safety. These worthy
governmental initiatives had unintended political consequences: they
generated public concern about the extent and costs of government regulation. Business interests stoked that concern by funding think tanks
and other vehicles for promoting opposition to the role of the govern-

137
The high-profile role of Microsoft in making the contemporary political argument
against antitrust, discussed above, illustrates the potential for some big business interests
to conclude that, on the whole, they would benefit if antitrust law were to lose its teeth.
With its antitrust issues largely resolved in the United States, however, Microsoft has more
recently encouraged the Justice Department to undertake close scrutiny of Google's business conduct in markets in which Google and Microsoft compete. Google has to date not
chosen to attack the legitimacy of monopolization enforcement, preferring to argue that
itlacks market power (that competition is one click away).
138For a description of the broader context in this paragraph, see KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN,
INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO
REAGAN (2009); MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF FREE MARKETS: THE RISE OF NEOL1BERAL
ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BIUTAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY & THE UNITED STATES (2006); MARX A.
SMITH, THE RIGHT TALK: How CONSERVATIVES TRANSFORMED THE GREAT SOCIETY INTO THE
ECONOMIC SOCIETY (2007); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008).
139 "Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs," President Eisenhower, a Republican,
observed, "you would not hear of that party again in our political history." PHILLIPS-FEIN,
supra note 138, at 56.
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ment in economic affairs. 140 These developments favored the conservative agenda of "getting government off the backs of the American
people" and set the stage for a thirty-year conservative counter-revolution. A property tax revolt began in California in 1978, and Ronald Reagan rode the anti-tax and anti-government tide to the White House in
1980.
Since then, and lasting at least through mid-2008, the domestic economic policy agenda in the United States has been set largely by noninterventionist conservatives. The Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush
administrations in particular, and the elevation of Newt Gingrich to
Speaker of the House during the Clinton administration, gave the opposition to "big government" both legitimacy and a platform. While the
Clinton administration may have tempered the rough edges, even during the 1990s the domestic political debate on economic issues emphasized conservative concerns-control of federal budget deficits and
reducing the scope of the welfare system-and the Clinton administration's high-profile political push to provide health care for the unin41
sured was opposed by conservatives and did not succeed.
The economic ideal for non-interventionist conservatives is a government that simply protects contract and property rights and otherwise
stays out of the way of private economic activity.142 To achieve that end
politically, they have targeted taxes and regulation-an essential nutrient and a widely employed tool of government, respectively. Some conservatives justify this approach instrumentally, as the best way to keep
the "dead hand" of government from impeding the "invisible economic
hand" of growth and prosperity. Others see the free market as a critical
means of promoting freedom and morality. Whatever the justification
for reducing the role of government in economic affairs, the election of
Ronald Reagan marked a sea change in American politics, after which
New Deal institutions were placed on the defensive.
The recent monopolization controversy could be interpreted as an
instance of this broad anti-big government effort spilling over to antitrust. Some political actors with longstanding and deep ties to the non140 These organizations generally operated by identifying like-minded scholars for financial support and helping them raise their public profile, not by paying scholars to change
their views.
'41In his 1996 State of the Union message, President Clinton made headlines by adopting non-interventionist rhetoric, declaring that the "era of big government is over." Alison
Mitchell, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation, Declaring "Eraof
Big Government is Over," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al.
142 Many conservatives favor a more ambitious role for government in non-economic
realms, however, particularly to promote national defense and to protect moral values.
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interventionist wing of the Republican Party, longstanding hostility to
New Deal programs, and a deep commitment to the conservative political program of cutting taxes, shrinking government, and repealing regulation have argued against antitrust enforcement14 -- suggesting a tie
between hostility to the antitrust enterprise and their broader political
program.
Non-interventionist conservative views about antitrust made substantial headway during the George W. Bush administration. As previously
recounted, Congress appeared sympathetic to a less-interventionist antitrust in 2002, when it created the Antitrust Modernization Commission
and charged it with proposing updates to the antitrust laws against the
background of Microsoft's political argument that questioned monopolization standards. 144 The Supreme Court's dicta in Trinko, a 2004 decision, arguably endorsed the non-interventionist perspective on
monopolization in a majority opinion that obtained the vote of six justices. 145 The Justice Department brought no monopolization cases between 2001 and 2008, except for three technical violations. 46 The
Antitrust Division seemed to support the non-interventionist view of monopolization in its 2004 amicus brief in Trinko and, in 2008, in its Sec143E.g., Americans for Tax Reform, supra note 113. See An Open Letter to President
Clinton from 240 Economists on Antitrust Protectionism (June 2, 1999), available at
http://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=483.
144Congress and the courts have also created at least thirty antitrust exemptions. See
AMC REPORT, supranote 55, at 378; ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAw (Monograph No. 24) (2007). Also, in 1995, the House
Judiciary Committee ended its longstanding antitrust subcommittee, seemingly signaling
lack of interest in antitrust issues, although in succeeding years it occasionally created
part-time antitrust task forces.
145 The Court's skepticism in Trinko about the value of antitrust enforcement, and its
resulting preference for having competition issues decided exclusively by an industry regulator rather than preserving concurrent jurisdiction in an antitrust court, continued in
2007, when the Court expanded the implied antitrust immunity conferred by regulation
under the securities laws. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
The Court has also recently expressed concern that antitrust cases in particular are subject to abuse by plaintiffs, who may exploit the threat of costly discovery, the uncertain
outcome of jury trials, and the possibility of treble damages to extract unwarranted and
excessively generous settlements from defendants. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556-57 (2007); id. at 589-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf Daniel A. Crane, linkLine's
Institutional Suspicions, 2008-2009 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 111, 127 (2009) (recent Supreme
Court antitrust decisions evidence a "disdain for treble damages cases,juries, complaining
competitors, and the antitrust plaintiffs' bar").
146
Three horizontal merger complaints brought late during the George W. Bush administration alleged mergers to monopoly, so were pleaded with a monopolization cause of
action as well as under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. None involved exclusionary conduct.
Complaint, United States v. Microsemi Corp., Civil Action No. 1:08cv1311 (ATJ/JFA)
(E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2008); Complaint, United States v. Amsted Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 1: 07CV-00710 (D.D.C. Apr. 18. 2007); Complaint, United States v. Daily Gazette Co., 567 F.
Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. W.Va. 2008).
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tion 2 report. 147 At times during those years it appeared possible thatall
three branches of the federal government were shifting to adopt the
non-interventionist perspective toward monopolization-for the first
time since the political bargain was established in the mid-20th century. 148 Adoption of the non-interventionist perspective by all three
branches could lead to a broad reworking of the political bargain or
repeal of the bargain altogether.
These gestures toward a new, non-interventionist antitrust policy have
not added up to political mobilization to overturn the competition policy bargain, however, because they have been uncoordinated in timing,
they have not drawn bipartisan support, 149 and to date they have fallen
short of major change, 150 The Antitrust Modernization Commission
chose to reaffirm longstanding antitrust norms rather than seeking to
chart a new course, the Federal Trade Commission has continued to
bring monopolization cases,' 51 and a majority of FTC Commissioners
pointedly dissented from the Justice Department's views regarding monopolization in the Section 2 report. During the past three decades,
moreover, the heads of the Antitrust Division who have been most critical of antitrust rules governing exclusionary conduct generally, and mo147 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, a mainstream antitrust scholar and co-author of the
leading antitrust treatise, has described the DOJ Report as "extremely tolerant of singlefirm conduct." Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and § 2 of the Sherman
Act 1 (July 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437688. But cf Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae, 3M Co. v. LePage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/cases/f203900/203900.pdf (DOJ recommended that the Supreme Court
not review a verdict for the plaintiff in a monopolization case involving bundled rebates,
in order to allow further development of the law in the lower courts).
148During antitrust's Chicago School revolution, two branches of the federal government-the courts and the Executive branch-were enthusiastic about the new approach.
But Congress (as well as the states) questioned various aspects, helping ensure that the
outcome was limited to reforming the political bargain rather than reneging on it. Baker,
Political Bargain, supra note 40, at 505-15.
149Cf How THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 130 (critical response to recent trends in antitrust law and enforcement policy from commentators who
argue that those trends do not enhance efficiency and consumer welfare). (Ico-authored
one of the chapters in this volume, on merger policy.) See also supra Part I.B (discussing
the economic counterarguments that have been offered in response to the non-interventionist policy critique of monopolization standards). By contrast, the Chicago School concerns about the overbreadth of structural era antitrust doctrines were more generally
shared by Democrats and Republicans, although the precise nature of the appropriate
reforms was contested and the traditional rules had some strong defenders.
150
Since the late 1970s, the Supreme Court has reformed antitrust doctrines to make
them consistent with the Chicago School perspective, and a supermajority in the Court
today endorses that program. But the Court has not in general gone farther to question
the legitimacy of the antitrust statutes, with the notable exception of the dicta on monopolization in the majority opinion in Trinko.
151
William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?
16 CEo. MASON L. REV. 903, 911 (2009).
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nopolization in particular, have simultaneously offered strong support
to the rules against horizontal price fixing. 15 2 The long-term conservative
attack on big government is not closely tied to antitrust, and it is hard to
see the non-interventionist pressure on monopolization rules as a key
plank in the platform of the conservative political movement. 53
The prospects for undoing the competition bargain under non-interventionist pressure appear to be waning. At the start of the 21st century, the popular mood might have accepted non-interventionist
antitrust initiatives as beneficial pro-market steps. But that mood
changed sharply during the late 2008 financial crisis and the recession
that followed, shifting away from the non-interventionist approach to
domestic economic policy generally and toward reaffirming the legitimacy of the regulatory and social insurance programs created during
the New Deal. The shift was crystallized in late October 2008 when former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, a well-known advocate
of the non-interventionist approach, admitted that the financial crisis
15 4
had revealed a "flaw" in his free-market ideology.
The Democratic electoral sweep in 2008 confirmed that popular support for criticism of government regulation had faded. 155 This setback to
the broad conservative program could help insulate the competition
policy bargain-which is only on the periphery of the efforts to roll back
the New Deal-from the antitrust non-interventionists.
But some business interests have not given up on antitrust reform, 56
and, more broadly, non-interventionists have mobilized politically
152 E.g., 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General,Antitrust Division,
56 ANTITRUST L.J. 261, 264 (1987); 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 257 (1988); Barnett, supra note 72, at text
after note 12 ("Our enforcement efforts against cartels have never been stronger.").
153Competition policy has never been at the forefront of the conservative economic
agenda and the mid-20th century competition policy bargain survived antitrust's Chicago
School revolution. Most Chicagoans supported reworking the antitrust rules, particularly
to discard those aspects of prior doctrine tied more to social and political goals than to
economic ones, rather than scrapping the antitrust laws entirely. Baker, Political Bargain,
supra note 40, at 510-11.
154Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan ConcedesError on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008,
at B. But cf Gerald F. Seib, U.S. Shifted Party, Not Ideology, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A2
(polling data shows that throughout the January 2006 to January 2010 period, the U.S.
has remained, ideologically, "a center to center-right nation").
155 Not surprisingly, in May 2009, the Obama administration's new Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, Christine Varney, withdrew the previous administration's controversial Section 2 report and committed the Justice Department to "aggressively pursuing
enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act." Varney, supra note 13.
156As the new Obama administration was pondering what to do about the Section 2
report, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued that the report should be taken seriously
and not be summarily dismissed. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Bathwater Out. Now What to
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around their opposition to various aspects of health insurance reform. 7
A cautious analyst would wait to see whether the lessening of conservative control over the domestic policy agenda is confirmed in the way the
Democrats implement their legislative agenda during the Obama administration, 58. and in the results of national elections after the end of
the 2008-2009 financial crisis and recession, 5 9 before concluding that
the national economic agenda has shifted away from the concerns of the
non-interventionists and that the competition policy bargain is safe from
collateral damage in their larger fight to undermine the legitimacy of
the government's modern role in the economy.

Do With Economic Analysis? Antitrust Standardsfor Unilateral Conduct: Sense and Consensus,
GLOBAL COMPETITION POL'Y, Mar. 10, 2009. During the first decade of the 21st century,
moreover, some prominent members of the antitrust defense bar have pressed across-theboard criticisms of the antitrust system. E.g., EDWIN S. ROCKEFELLER, THE ANTITRUST RELIGION (2007); Ky EWING, JR., COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES
FROM AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE (2003). Both Rockefeller and Ewing have served as Chair of
the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, the leading organization of competition lawyers in the
United States.
57
1 In the 2009 debate over the "public option"-the proposed creation of a government-run insurance plan to compete with private insurers-non-interventionist conservatives tended to view the proposal as a Trojan horse that would result in the eventual
adoption of a government-run health care system to supplant private enterprise rather
than, as many proponents claimed, the most promising method of creating a competitive
insurance market to control insurance costs. Although a number of progressive supporters of the public option favored.a government-run "single payer" health insurance system,
they tended to view the public option as an acceptable but less preferable alternative. In
this debate, the public option was defended primarily on competition grounds, as the best
way to prevent the exercise of market power in the many regions in which private health
insurance was controlled by a dominant firm. See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Public Option Is Next Big Hurdle in Health Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at Al. The public option
did not survive the legislative process, but at the end of 2009 one influential progressive
commentator, Paul Krugman, nevertheless viewed what then appeared to be the likely
enactment of a health care bill as "a historic moment" on the ground that it would represent "a rejection of the [conservative] view that the solution for all problems is to cut
some taxes and remove some regulations." Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal,
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ (Dec. 19, 2009, 3:55 pm EST). Not surprisingly, conservatives disagree: early in 2010, senior Republican party fundraisers sought to woo major donors with the slogan, "Save the country from trending toward Socialism!" Ben
Smith, Exclusive: RNC Document Mocks Donors, Plays on "Fear," POLITICO, Mar. 3, 2010,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/33866.html.
1
- At the start of the Obama administration, the legislative agenda of the Democrats in
the White House and Congress emphasized universal health insurance, green energy,
financial services regulation, and universal access to broadband communications. The
non-interventionist concern about big government would tend to discourage major initiatives and broad reforms in these areas, even if those programs eschew redistribution and
regulation in favor of fostering competition.
159 On the run-up to the 2010 midterm elections, Republican prospects for success appear strong. If that outcome occurs, it may reflect popular unhappiness with the political
process generally, rather than a preference for the non-interventionist approach to economic policy. See generally Charlie Cook, Ready, Aim, Fire, Repeat, COOK POLITICAL REP.,
Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.cookpolitical.com/node/5881.
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2. A Bargain with Complex Rules
Second, competition policy standards may change if the terms of the
bargain incorporate variations in doctrinal rules or enforcement standards that respond to changes in the external environment in order to
prevent cheating. 60 In particular, antitrust rules or well-established enforcement policy could allow for more lenient treatment of producers
for a time, triggered by changes in firm payoffs or discount rates that
might seem to favor producer cheating, in order to make cheating less
16
attractive to large firms than continuation of the bargain. '
Consistent with this possibility, some antitrust rules do exhibit flexibility. Court decisions and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, for example,
1 62
give failing firms and so-called "flailing" firms more ability to merge.
But that flexibility is triggered by firm- and industry-specific developments rather than by changes in the calculus affecting broad interest
groups. Other antitrust rules-particularly the rule of reason-could
also in theory vary in application as necessary to ensure that interest
groups share the efficiency benefits of competition, and not prefer
cheating on the political bargain. But it is hard to argue that this is how
such rules are applied in practice.' 63 Moreover, there is a great deal of
continuity over time in antitrust norms,'6 and if this were the explanation for the non-interventionist push to modify monopolization standards, those proposals would not be so controversial. Accordingly, this
second possibility for explaining changes in antitrust rules within the
framework of a competition policy bargain can be set aside as
implausible.
160Similarly, Levenstein and Suslow conclude that successful cartels tend to develop organizational methods that confer side payments as necessary to deter firms from cheating
following changes in the external environment, such as cyclical variation in demand, without renegotiation. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 132, at 67-74, 78; Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration 31
(Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id=1471393.
161 If the rules took this form, one would also expect the rules to shift rents toward
consumers when necessary to prevent consumer cheating on the bargain.
162 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) (failing firm defense); FTC v. Harbour
Group Inv., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,247 (D.D.C. 1990) (same); United States v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506-08 (1974) (acquisition is unlikely to harm competition if acquired firm would not be a significant competitive force absent the merger)
(sometimes termed a General Dynamics defense or "flailing" firm defense).
163 Even after losing multiple hospital mergers, for example, the enforcement agencies
have not concluded that the rules are different for hospitals. See TimothyJ. Muris, Everything Old Is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the 21st Century (Nov. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murishealthcarespeech0211 .pdf. Instead
they have worked to improve their litigation tactics and continue to bring cases.
164Kovacic, Enforcement Norms, supra note 6.
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3. Attempts to Renegotiate the Rules
Third, changing antitrust standards may reflect the renegotiation of
individual rules to better advance their goals. 165 In the case of antitrust
rules, reform of the rules can increase the efficiency gains from competition in the economy. 166 The recent controversy over monopolization
rules, under this plausible interpretation, reflects the operation of a process by which proposals for reform of individual antitrust rules are
refereed.

In this view, the key protagonists in the monopolization debate are
litigants in individual court cases, the enforcement agencies in their enforcement decisions, briefs as party or amicus, and public statements,
and interest groups seeking antitrust exemptions or other legislation
from Congress. These parties propose approaches to applying (or modifying) legal doctrines, accompanied by a legal or economic policy argu167
ment defending those proposals as enhancing economic welfare. If
the institutions that referee such proposals can successfully discriminate.
between renegotiation proposals that benefit all the parties to the political bargain and those that undermine the bargain, the goals of the political bargain will be advanced, interest groups will see cheating on the
bargain as less advantageous than sticking with it, and covert reneging
by accretion of small decisions favoring one side of the bargain will be
avoided.
During the late 1970s and through the 1980s-when antitrust's Chicago School revolution took root-the political bargain was reformed in
a similar process, through the accumulation in the courts of individual
changes in antitrust doctrine. Those doctrinal modifications likely increased the social surplus available from antitrust enforcement by target168
ing the rules more closely than before to prohibit inefficient conduct.
165Similarly, much apparent cheating in the cartel context is better understood as part
of a process in which a cartel renegotiates the terms of its coordinated consensus. See
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 132, at 78.
166This is not an argument that all legal rules tend toward efficiency. Rather, the claim
is that under the political bargain, antitrust rules in particular aim to promote efficiency
in the economy and to ensure those gains are shared between producers and consumers.
Accordingly, rule changes that enhance the joint surplus available for producers and consumers to split can advance the purpose of the bargain. See generally Baker, Political Bargain, supra note 40, at 492 (distinguishing political bargain idea from the claim that the
law tends toward efficient rules).
167Reforms that increase aggregate surplus and those that increase consumer surplus
tend to go hand in hand, though sometimes such proposals can get caught.up in a perennial antitrust policy dispute as to the appropriate welfare standard. See id. at 515-22 (brief
discussion with references to the literature).
6 Antitrust rules were refocused solely on economic goals, without consideration for
the social and political goals that had informed those rules in the past. In consequence,
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Outside of predatory pricing, however, the Supreme Court left monopolization rules largely untouched. 69 The contemporary non-interventionists in the monopolization controversy likely view their proposals as bids
for reform consistent in spirit with the way many other antitrust doctrines were modified under Chicago School influence in the past. 170
The interpretation of the monopolization controversy as a bid for renegotiation is consistent with the institutional role of the courts in specifying and implementing antitrust rules. The common law-like evolution
of antitrust rules makes the federal courts an appropriate institution for
refereeing proposals for reform of individual rules. Relying on courts to
play this role tends to protect the political bargain in two ways. First, the
process of legal reasoning and judicial decision making encourages
judges to make principled decisions. In antitrust cases,judges hear arguments from both sides, the arguments frame economic policy questions,
and judges look to establish principles that rationalize legal precedent
and make economic sense. Modified legal rules generally do not have
broad applicability until they are endorsed by multiple judges, including
at least one panel of appellate judges.
Second, the role of precedent in judicial decision making, in theory,
helps protect the political bargain. Lower courts are constrained by precedent; the Supreme Court is also constrained to a lesser extent. 71 This
constraint creates inertia, slowing the pace of change. Inertia also helps
the Chicago School reforms also had a distributional effect: they generally shifted the
rules in a less interventionist direction, favoring producer interests.
169At the end of the 1970s, however, decisions by the Second Circuit and the FTC cut
back on the expansive concept of exclusionary conduct employed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa), the leading structural era monopolization decision. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir.
1979); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (dismissing allegations that
DuPont had attempted to monopolize the market for titanium dioxide through conduct
similar to the conduct found to have supported monopolization in Alcoa).
170Thus, contemporary critiques of monopolization rules generally favor less
intervention.
171The Supreme Court has at times overruled longstanding antitrust precedents. Doing
so potentially conflicts with a norm ofjudicial conduct, leading the Court in such cases to
provide an extensive legal and policy justification for its action. E.g., Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899-907 (2007); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). When the Court wishes to change course, it may
instead limit prior decisions, as it arguably has recently attempted to do with dicta characterizing Aspen Skiing. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 399 (2004) ("Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability");
Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009) (Aspen
suggests that a firm's unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust
liability in "limited circumstances"). The latter approach keeps old precedents alive, so
can delay legal change. When Assistant Attorney General Varney wished to signal her
interest in monopolization enforcement, she thus was able to cite Aspen Skiing, Lorain
Journal,and Microsoft-all influential precedents predating Trinko that have not been over-
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protect the political bargain by facilitating the political mobilization of
interest groups to counter legal change whenever the political bargain is
placed in danger. 172 But inertia may also work the other way if it makes it
difficult for the courts, having begun to change doctrine, to swing back
later.
Courts are not asked to play an explicitly political role in this process;
they are merely asked to decide individual antitrust cases, relying on
legal reasoning and precedent. This limited role does not threaten the
legitimacy of the judicial branch. Accordingly, the process of litigationparticularly case selection by plaintiffs and the arguments proffered by
litigants and amici-leads judges to respond to political forces indirectly, as they somehow must do if they are to protect a political bargain
from erosion, without leading courts to undertake nakedly political deci173
sion making, as would undermine their legitimacy.
It is an open question whether these advantages of the federal courts
in reviewing proposals for renegotiation of the political bargain outweigh the disadvantage of relying on generalist judges, who lack antitrust expertise.1 4 Perhaps a specialized antitrust court would do better,
although the experience of the Federal Circuit cautions that a specialized court may instead promote its field at the expense of the public
75
interest.1
Other institutions could play the role of referee when renegotiation
of the political bargain is proposed, and to some extent already do so.
The enforcement agencies informally referee proposals when they set
enforcement policy, and Congress could play this role by modifying statutes (though it rarely does in the antitrust area). As with the courts,
these institutions also have features that create inertia, 76 facilitating
ruled. Varney, supra note 13. She ignored Trinko entirely, implicitly treating it.as a narrow
decision limited to regulated industries.
172 Cf McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
1706 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (Congress often awaits complaints
to trigger concern that an agency is not properly implementing congressional policy). In
the political bargain model, adversity facilitates political mobilization by helping interest
groups solve collective action problems. Baker, PoliticalBargain, supra note 40, at 487-90.
173 Cf GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (the Supreme Court has a difficult time bringing about major
social change through legal reform absent popular support for that outcome).
174 However, appellate opinions by conservative antitrust experts, such as Frank Easterbrook, Douglas Ginsburg, and Richard Posner, may be more influential than most.
175See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of InstitutionalIdentity: The FederalCircuit Comes
of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 787 (2008); Craig Allen Nard &John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619 (2007).
76
' The continuity among career staff at the enforcement agencies helps preserve continuity in agency policies, and the presence of multiple enforcers-two federal agencies,
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counter-mobilization by threatened interest groups. Still, the present
system, which assigns the primary refereeing role to the courts, was successful in preserving the political bargain while addressing the pressure
for reform during antitrust's Chicago School revolution.
III. PROSPECTS FOR DOCTRINAL CHANGE
Against the background of viewing competition policy as a political
bargain, the monopolization controversy instigated by conservative noninterventionists could play out in multiple ways. One possibility is that
the non-interventionists will win. The Supreme Court could adopt a disproportionate impact or no economic sense test outside the price predation context, and justify that decision by accepting explicitly the
economic policy arguments against monopolization enforcement while
rejecting the counter-arguments-thereby signaling that exclusionary
conduct cases against dominant firms will have become as difficult for
plaintiffs (public and private) to win as predatory pricing cases are now.
The same result could arise less dramatically through multiple decisions
by the lower courts.
A non-interventionist victory of this sort could represent a rejection of
the competition policy bargain in favor of greater reliance on business
self-regulation. That would be a reasonable interpretation if monopolization standards do not change alone but instead are modified as part of
a wide-ranging national political shift, accompanied by changes in regulatory policy that go well beyond the adoption of pro-defendant antitrust
liability rules governing the conduct of dominant firms. Courts might
impose additional limitations on antitrust enforcement, such as setting a
higher bar for proving unlawful exclusion in concerted action cases or
introducing additional, targeted impediments to private antitrust enforcement. Congress might restrict other types of regulation, for example, limiting environmental regulation or workplace safety rules. The
federal government's role in national economic life could shrink markedly, perhaps reflected in broad tax relief and cutbacks in social welfare
programs.
This outcome-a decisive rejection of the competition policy bargain
by the Supreme Court in favor of business self-regulation and laissezfaire-appears unlikely because of the political response it would pro-

state enforcers, and private plaintiffs-makes it difficult to change the law through nonenforcement. Legislative change is not common in the antitrust field and, in the U.S.
system, it is difficult to engineer.
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voke. 77 After the late 2008 financial crisis and the results of the 2008
election, it is hard to see Congress and the Executive Branch accepting
that result. A hypothetical example suggests how the political system
could prevent the demise of the competition policy bargain.
Suppose that the Federal Trade Commission decided against Intel in
the high-profile monopolization case it filed in late 2009,178 and the Supreme Court reversed that decision after an appellate review. Suppose
further that the Court, building on recent decisions such as Trinko,
wrote a broad and aggressively non-interventionist decision in favor of
Intel-rejecting a reasonableness standard and adopting in its place a
test that places a thumb on the scales to favor defendants (such as the
disproportionate effects or no economic sense test)-and defended its
decision with a strong endorsement of the six economic arguments
against monopolization enforcement set forth in Part II.B.17 By doing
so, the Court would make non-price exclusionary conduct cases as difficult to prove in the lower courts as predatory pricing is today.
Such a decision could fuel a political controversy both within and
outside the antitrust world. The extent to which it would do so depends
in part on internal factors, such as the breadth of the decision and its
rationale, the extent to which the Court is split, and the vehemence of
any dissent. Its political salience would also depend on external factors,
particularly whether political actors opposed to the outcome can convincingly tie the hypothetical decision to others in order to frame the
Court as coddling monopolists and looking out for the narrow interests
177 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), overturning the longstanding per se rule against resale
price maintenance, one state (Maryland) has enacted legislation prohibiting the practice
under state law and a congressional committee has held hearings on similar federal legislation. See generally Michael A. Lindsay, State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After Leegin,

ANTITRUST SOURCE,

Oct. 2009, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/10/Octo9-

Lindsayl0-23f.pdf.
178 Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (complaint), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf. The complaint, brought under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, frames a monopolization violation. The
allegations include claims that Intel employed "penalties, rebates, lump-sum and other
payments across multiple products, [and] differential pricing" to maintain its monopoly
power in the market for central processing units, an integrated circuit chip often described as the "brains" of a computer system. Id. 55. These allegations lie near the line
separating price predation from other exclusionary conduct by monopolists, and so raise
the tension between the legal standards governing the review of these types of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms discussed above in Part I.A.
179 Assume, in addition, that the decision clearly governs cases brought under Sherman
Act Section 2 and is not limited to cases brought under FTC Act Section 5. See, e.g., FTC v.
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (upholding an FTC decision made pursuant
to FTC Act Section 5 on the basis that the condemned practice violated the Sherman
Act).
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of big business rather than the interests of consumers or the public as a
180
whole.
If the hypothetical pro-Intel decision did come to fruition and created
such a debate, other governmental institutions might respond by undoing its result' 81-with legislation overturning it, through aggressive enforcement of state competition laws governing the conduct of dominant
firms, or, after the composition of the Court changes, with a new decision limiting or overruling the Court's modification of monopolization
law. Recognizing this possibility, 8 2 it would take an unusually self-confident and determined Court to provoke such a controversy on its own, 83
84
without a strong political wind at its back.1
80

1 For example, if the hypothetical Intel decision had been handed down during the

same term that the Court struck down restrictions on political contributions by corporations under the First Amendment, it is possible to imagine the two decisions together
leading to a broader national debate over whether large firms play a beneficial or harmful
role in our economy and political life than either would generate alone.
"81 Cf Barry Friedman, Benched: Why the Supreme Court Is Irrelevant, NEW REPUBLiC, Oct. 1,
2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/benched ("Time and again throughout history, when the Court has run afoul of popular politics and the political branches, the
justices have paid a price.").
182Even if the Court is sympathetic to the non-interventionist approach to monopolization doctrine, it may fear a political backlash from an expansive decision and so find for
Intel in an uncontroversial way (e.g., holding for Intel on narrow grounds, or deciding
the case in Intel's favor on procedural or factual grounds that do not require modification to the substantive standards governing monopolization). On the other hand, the
Court may discount the possibility of a political reaction on the ground that any such
response would take time and the political environment could change before opposing
political forces successfully mobilize to overcome legislative inertia.
183On the other hand, the current Supreme Court may be unusually self-confident and
determined. "The current Court, the most conservative since 1937... has backtracked on
the broad New Deal understanding of federal power to regulate interstate commerce and
has invalidated federal statutes with something approaching abandon. .. ." Richard Posner, 1937, 2010, NEW REPuBLIc, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/19372010. But cf Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive: Did the Roberts Court
Misjudge the Public Mood on Campaign Finance Reform? SLATE, Jan. 25, 2010, http://www.
slate.com/id/2242557/ (until a 2010 decision on the constitutionality of campaign finance reform, the Roberts Court did "a remarkable job of conforming its behavior to the
prevailing public mood, resisting the impulse to go too far"). The Court's upcoming decision in American Needle, Inc. v. National FootballLeague, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (June 29, 2009)) may provide a window into its willingness to
pursue an aggressive non-interventionist approach to antitrust in the current political
environment.
84
1 The Trinko decision was handed down when the other branches of government, particularly the Executive Branch, were substantially more sympathetic to the non-interventionist perspective than they appear today. Even then, the Court did not accept the
government's invitation to adopt the no economic sense test. See Brief of the United
States and Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201048.htm. If, in a new monopolization matter like the hypothetical Intel case, the Court nevertheless issues an expansive non-interventionist decision, and the political reaction does not weaken or overturn its holding
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If the courts endorse the non-interventionist arguments on monopolization standards, it is more realistic to suppose that such decisions
would be framed as fine-tuning antitrust rules to better advance the
goals of competition policy, not as questioning whether the benefits of
antitrust enforcement exceed the costs. They would be presented as similar in spirit to the modifications to other antitrust rules associated with
the success of the Chicago School, not as subverting the competition
policy bargain. That is, judicial opinions accepting non-interventionist
proposals to modify monopolization doctrine would likely present the
change in standards as a reform that advances competition policy goals
as thosegoals have been understood since the 1980s.
Even in this more limited form, the non-interventionist effort to raisethe burden for plaintiffs seeking to demonstrate monopolization by exclusionary conduct faces hurdles. The prospects for success of a renewed non-interventionist bid for reform of antitrust rules are less today
than they were three decades ago, when Chicago critiques led to thoroughgoing modifications of antitrust doctrines without overthrowing
the political bargain, for three reasons.
First, during the 1980s, a bipartisan consensus, reflected in all three
branches of the federal government, favored some sort of economic deregulation and antitrust reform. By contrast, there is no bipartisan consensus today that antitrust rules generally, or monopolization rules in
particular, are overly restrictive or that they undermine economic goals
in the pursuit of social and political goals. Second, the economic arguments in favor of reform of monopolization rules have been strongly
(and, in my view, persuasively) countered by economic arguments in
favor of preserving current rules governing non-price exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. 8 5 Finally, among the three branches of the federal government, only the judiciary now seems inclined toward the noninterventionist position on monopolization,'8 6 and its makeup may be(contrary to what I have supposed), an emboldened Court and its allies in other branches
of government might be expected to take further steps to dismantle the post-New Deal
regulatory state, potentially upsetting the competition policy bargain and replacing it with
a laissez-faire system to govern economic affairs.
185 See discussion supra Part I.B.
6
18 The Supreme Court majority that decided Trinko appeared sympathetic to the noninterventionist critique, and recent changes in the composition of the Court are unlikely
to shift its antitrust jurisprudence. On the role of conservative judicial appointments in
securing and preserving the success of antitrust's Chicago School revolution, see William
E. Kovacic, Reagan'sJudicialAppointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FoRDA L. Rrv. 49
(1991). With respect to the rest of the government, the rejection of the political challenge
to traditional monopolization standards, combined with the recent setback to the broad
political movement to reverse the New Deal in the financial crisis and 2008 elections, have
likely placed the advocates of non-interventionist antitrust on the defensive. But cf. Daniel
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gin to change as the Obama administration moves forward with judicial
appointments. Hence, even a proposal to revise monopolization standards conceived as extending the Chicago School reforms of antitrust
doctrine to a previously untouched area may be too partisan to succeed
87
today.
For the above reasons, I am skeptical about the current prospects for
success of the non-interventionist effort to change monopolization standards. Courts are likely to leave the legal standard governing predatory
conduct by a dominant firm largely unchanged, issuing to the extent
possible narrow decisions that resolve monopolization cases based on
their particular facts and procedural posture without reaching the substantive legal standard.18

A. Crane, Obama's Antitrust Agenda, REGULATION, Fall 2009, at 16, 20 ("Obama's antitrust
ambitions face significant obstacles in the courts, in Congress, in other regulatory agencies, and in the market itself.").
187 Leegin, the 2007 decision discarding the per se rule against resale price maintenance,
presented a different dynamic so provides a poor guide to how the Supreme Court might
approach a monopolization matter like the hypothetical Intel case. Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). Against the background of previous resale price maintenance decisions, the holding in Leegin was not a surprise. The
Court had narrowed the per se rule in several decisions since Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 443 U.S. 36 (1977), when it set forth a new perspective on non-price vertical
restraints that ultimately led it to question the per se rule regarding vertical agreements
concerning price. In particular, the Court had raised the burden of proof for plaintiffs in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) and Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988), and abandoned the per se rule for maximum
resale price maintenance in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). Moreover, most economists concerned about the anticompetitive potential of the practice had difficulty defending a per se prohibition as opposed to the rule of reason. See, e.g., Brief for William S.
Comanor and Frederic M. Scherer as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), available at http://www.
antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/aai-%20Leegin,%2OComanor%20&%2OScherer%20
amicus%20brief_021820071955.pdf (preferring a structured rule of reason approach to
the unstructured rule of reason proposed by other economists). Even with all this going
for it, though, Leegin was adopted by only a narrow majority. The decision drew a passionate dissent, but many observers credited the heat to concern by the dissenters that the
majority's willingness to overturn well-established precedent was a rehearsal for a future
decision reversing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Alan Devlin, On the Ramifications of
Leegin Creative Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: Are Tie-Ins Next? 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 387,
395-96 (2008), Einer Elhauge, Harvard,Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent

Supreme Court Decisions?, COMPETITION

POL'Y INT'L,

Autumn 2007, at 59, 66; Andrew I.

Gavil, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in HistoricalContext, ANTITRUST, Fall
2007, at 21, 24. Moreover, the Leegin dissent defended the per se rule on the basis of stare
decisis, not on the merits.
188 The Supreme Court could conceivably reject the non-interventionist proposals explicitly and reaffirm a reasonableness standard on grounds of the economic counter-arguments. In theory, it could even adopt antitrust reforms advocated by consumer interests,
but that outcome is highly improbable for the current Court.
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Three future developments could make the success of the non-intergentionist proposals on monopolization more likely. First, in the economic policy arena, it is possible that new economic thinking or
empirical studies would strengthen the economic arguments for the
non-interventionist position on monopolization doctrine, making the
argument for revising the standard to the benefit of dominant firm defendants more convincing. 18 9 Second, it is possible that the federal enforcement agencies will bring monopolization cases against multiple
large and well-known firms and those companies will follow Microsoft's
lead in challenging publicly the legitimacy of antitrust enforcement. 190 If
such an effort changes the political dynamic in Congress, it could embolden the Supreme Court to push monopolization law specifically and
antitrust generally in a non-interventionist direction.
Finally, it is possible that the larger non-interventionist domestic policy agenda targeting governmental interference with the free market
will return to prominence in domestic economic policy debates. 191 That
agenda continues to have strong advocates, particularly within the national Republican Party. 192 The success of a reinvigorated conservative
political movement could bring about a renewed effort to discard the
political bargain adopting competition in favor of laissez-faire, leading
to changes in antitrust law that go beyond relaxation of the monopolization rules. The specific rules implementing the competition policy bargain will undoubtedly change, as the future brings disputes with new
factual settings, different judges on the bench, and new economic in-

189Of course, new studies could instead strengthen the economic counter-arguments.
190Intel's initial response to the FTC complaint charged that the agency had not done a
thorough investigation and argued that the remedies that the FTC sought were excessively restrictive, but did not question the legitimacy of monopolization enforcement.
Press Release, Intel Comments on FTC Suit (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.intel.
com/pressroom/archive/releases/2009/20091216corp.htm. Intel's General Counsel, A.
Douglas Melamed, is an experienced antitrust lawyer who served as Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in the Clinton administration, where he helped
direct the government's case against Microsoft.
191At times that agenda is tied rhetorically to concerns about the long-run sustainability
of public sector fiscal deficits given the projected growth of health care and Social Security spending, but the two issues are logically distinct. The deficit grew substantially during
the two modern administrations most sympathetic to the non-interventionist position
(Reagan and G.W. Bush). Moreover, fiscal problems can be addressed by raising revenues
as well as reducing spending, and lower spending need not be accompanied by less
regulation.
192Cf Kim Phillips-Fein, Right On, THE NATION, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20090928/phillips-fein ("[D]espite the financial crisis of the past
year, the faith in laissez-faire that conservatives promoted throughout the postwar period
continues to exercise a deep hold on American politics.").
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sights from the academy. But without a broad political mobilization by
non-interventionists, the political bargain itself seems, at least for -the
moment, secure.

